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The Establishment of a Rule Against 
Hearsay in Romano-
Canonical Procedure 
FRANK R. HERRMANN, S.J.::: 
I. INTRODUcrIONl 
Anglo-American evaluations of the hearsay rule manifest a cer-
tain schizophrenia. On the one hand, hearsay is praised as the 
"greatest contribution" of Anglo-American law to the world's 
jurisprudence? According to proponents of the rule, the hearsay 
bar provides a salutary mechanism to judges who are distrustful of 
the abilities and fairness of the jury.3 By barring hearsay. the 
judge, as gatekeeper of the evidence, can prevent the jury. an 
"untrained tribunal,"4 from overestimating the value of hearsay 
statements that may be unreliable.s 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. For their helpful re .. iews of 
earlier drafts of this Article, the author is grateful to Aviam Soifer, Dean and Professor at 
Boston College Law School; Professors Ingrid M. Hillinger, James R. Repetti and Mark S. 
Brodin of Boston College Law School; and Professor Charles Donahue. Jr. of Harvard 
Law School. 
1. All translations in this Article are the work of the author. English language 
translations consulted are: of the cited works of Cicero and Quintilian, the translations 
accompanying the texts in the respective Loeb Classical Library editions; of Justinian's 
Digest, The Digest of Justinian (Theodor Momrnsen & Paul Krueger cds., Alan Watson 
trans., 4 vols. 1985); and of Beaumanoir's Courumes de Beauvaisis, The Coullunes de 
Beauvaisis of Philippe de Beaumanoir (F.R.P. Akehurst trans., 1992). 
Volumes in the series Monumenta Germaniae historica and Monumenta iuris canonici 
are cited as MGH and MIC, respectively. Volumes in the series Patrologiae cursus 
completus, edited and published by J.P. Migne (Series Latina,221 vols., Paris 1844-1891) 
are cited as Patrologia Latina. 
2. John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule,17 Harv. L Rev. 437,458 (1904). 
3. James B. Thayer, Legal Essays 265-66 (1927). 
4. Id. at 265. 
5. Id. 
HeinOnline -- 36 Va. J. Int’l L. 2 1995-1996
2 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 36:1 
Proponents of the contrary view regard the hearsay bar as a 
complex of cumbersome rules and exceptions that are, in the final 
analysis, "an unintelligible thicket."6 Worse than that, the rule is 
basically unnecessary. Because jurors today are "increasingly well-
educated and capable, under guidance from the court, of assessing 
probative force,"7 the need for the rule is substantially diminished. 
These contrasting assessments of the hearsay rule, however dif-
ferent in their conclusions, share a common starting point. Both 
the positive and the negative view begin with the assumption that 
the hearsay rule owes its existence to the institution of the Anglo-
American jury. If the jury is viewed as a group of gullible 
factfinders, who are dangerously prone to attribute excessive value 
to hearsay statements, then the bar's discipline contributes to relia-
ble verdicts. If, on the contrary, the jury is viewed as a temporary 
community of sophisticated factfinders, who can be trusted to 
assess hearsay accurately, then the rule's barriers impede reliable 
judgments. Both views focus on the institution of the jury for justi-
fication, or lack thereof, for the hearsay rule's existence.s 
Such Anglo-American arguments that tie the hearsay rule to the 
jury fail to grasp the essential nature of the rule. In fact, the hear-
say rule developed on the European continent long before English 
juries began to receive witness testimony in court.9 An examina-
tion of the Continental rule's origin and growth in medieval 
Europe will show that the rationale for a rule against hearsay does 
not depend upon the presence of a jury. Even in the absence of a 
6. John M. Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 Vand. L. 
Rev. 741, 741 (1961), quoted in Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modem Hearsay Reform: 
The Importance of Complexity, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 367,371 n.11 (1992). 
7. Jack B. Weinstein, Alternatives to the Present Hearsay Rules: Address Before the 
Annual Advocacy Institute (Nov. 17, 1967), in 44 F.R.D. 375, 377 (1968), noted in Mueller. 
supra note 6, at 373 n.21. 
8. "[By 1840] it became the fashion to attribute the exclusion of hearsay to the 
incapacity of the jury to evaluate, and in the development of exceptions to the rule, courts 
have doubtless been influenced by this notion." Eric D. Green & Charles R. Nesson. 
Problems. cases. and Materials on Evidence 512-13 n.l (2d ed. 1994) (quoting Model Code 
of Evidence 221 (1942)). Thayer viewed the English law of evidence as intelligible only "as 
a product of the jury system" in which "untrained citizens are acting as judges of fact." 
James B. Thayer. A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 509 (Boston, 
Little Brown 1898). 
9. The English jury, as judges of fact, did not generally depend upon witness testimony 
presented in court until some time during the sixteenth century. See 5 John H. Wigmore, 
Evidence § 1364, at 15 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 3d ed. 1974). The practice did not 
become firmly established until the early seventeenth century. Id. Before then, jurors 
gathered evidence by going about the countryside and making their own inquiry of persons 
who might know something about the case. Id. 
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jury, Western jurisprudence repudiated hearsay. By the thirteenth 
century. Continental jurists enshrined in law a deliberate value 
judgment that rested on the authority of much older Roman and 
canonical texts: hearsay should be rejected regardless of who the 
factfinder is, because a reliable verdict must be based on first-hand 
testimony at trial, subject to testing before the factfinder. The Eng-
lish jury system may provide a means to assure enforcement of the 
English hearsay bar, but the rejection of hearsay does not depend 
upon the jury for its rationale or for its origin in \Vestem legal 
culture. 
II. CLASSICAL ROf..iE 
Early Roman law made no assumption that the only testimony a 
factfinder should consider was the statement a witness gave in per-
son before the factfinder based on personal knowledge. In the 
classical period of Roman law, roughly from the first century 
B.C.E. through the first half of the third century C.E.,IO no limit 
existed on derivative testimony. Nonetheless, the reasons for mis-
trusting such secondary evidence were already apparent. Under-
standing the issues of hearsay in the classical period requires an 
appreciation of their context at trial. This, in tum, requires a sense 
of some salient features of Roman trial procedure. 11 
It had long been established by the first century B.C.E. that no 
citizen could be deprived of life or property ,vithout appropriate 
legal procedure. "[O]ur ancestors long ago set down ... that noth-
ing concerning the life of a citizen or his goods can be taken with-
out a judgment of the senate or of the people, or of those 
constituted judges concerning a particular matter. "12 As the 
10. The period of the Principate (27 B.C.E.-235 C.E.) is commonly identified as the 
classical period of Roman law. See Hans J. Wolff, Roman Law: An Historical Introduction 
91 (1951). Some authors consider the classical period to extend back to the late Republic. 
See Mauro Cappelletti & Joseph M. Perillo, Civil Procedure in Italy 5 (1965). 
11. Knowledge of the treatment of hearsay in this period is principally gleaned from the 
speeches of Cicero at public trials. See Wolfgang Kunkel, An Introduction to Roman 
Legal and Constitutional History 67 (J.M. Kelly trans., 2d ed. 1973). Criminal trials were 
closely modelled on suits of private law. See A.H.M. Jones, The Criminal Courts of the 
Roman Republic and Principate 46 (1972); Theodor Mommsen, ROmisches Strafrecht 343 
(Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot 1899). For a shon description of Roman chil procedure, 
see Leopold Wenger, The Roman Law of Civil Procedure,S Thl. L Rev. 353 (1931) (A. 
Arthur Schiller trans.). 
12. "[H]oc nobis esse a maioribus traditum ... ut nihil de capite civis aut de bonis sine 
iudicio seQatus aut populi aut eorum, qui de quaque re constituti iudices sint, detrahi 
possit." Cicero, De Domo sua 13.33 (57 B.C.E.), in Cicero, The Speeches 132, 172-74 
(N.H. Watts trans., 1923). 
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Roman Empire accorded citizenship to more and more persons 
within its regions, the scope of this guarantee expanded.13 
Trial procedure was accusatorial, at least by Cicero's day.14 Even 
a factually guilty person could not be convicted of a crime unless 
he was formally accused. IS A private accuser initiated an action 
after receiving permission from a magistrate.16 The accused was 
informed of the charge and the accuser's identityp and both par-
ties could be represented by advocates. IS 
The trial took place in public.19 In the earlier part of the classical 
period, the trial was held before jurors.20 Later, it took place 
before a governor or other delegate of the emperor,21 aided by an 
advisory council of distinguished persons.22 Individuals of high 
rank constituted the jury, which was of no fixed number.23 In one 
trial at which Cicero acted as defense counsel, the jury numbered 
fifty, equally divided among senators and knights.24 Conviction 
required an absolute majority vote.25 The accuser presented his 
case first26 and had the obligation to prove it.27 Witnesses were 
13. The lex Iulia (90 B.C.E.) extended Roman citizenship to all allies in Italy, and the lex 
Plautia Papiria (89 B.C.E.) allowed two months to any person domiciled in Italy to obtain 
citizenship upon request. See H.F. Jolowicz & Barry Nicholas, Historical Introduction to 
the Study of Roman Law 66 (3d ed. 1972). The consitutio Antoniniana (c. 212 C.E.) 
granted citizenship to virtually all inhabitants of the empire. See id. at 345-46. 
14. See Kunkel, supra note 11, at 67; Gustav Geib, Geschichte des rOmischen 
Criminalprocesses bis zum Tode Justinian's 254 (Leipzig, Weidmann'sche Buchhandlung 
1842). Although a magistrate could investigate on his own initiative, the accusatory form 
remained normal throughout the classical period. See Jolowicz & Nicholas, supra note 13, 
at 403. 
15. See Geib, supra note 14, at 254. 
16. See A.HJ. Greenidge, The Legal Procedure of Cicero'S Time 459-66 (photo. reprint 
1971) (1901); Jones, supra note 11, at 64, 110, 117; Kunkel, supra note 11, at 67. 
17. See Geib, supra note 14, at 270-73; Jones, supra note 11, at 64-65. 
18. See Jones, supra note 11, at 63-64. "The fairness with which the rules of Roman 
criminal procedure afforded the accused scope for making his defence is most impressive 
and might even seem to us exaggerated. He could sometimes have as many as six 
advocates appearing for him." Kunkel, supra note 11, at 68. 
19. See Wolfgang Kunkel, Prinzipien des rOmischen Strafverfahrens, in Kleine Schriften 
1, 23 (Hubert Niederllinder ed., 1974). 
20. See Jones, supra note 11, at 45, 91. 
21. See id. at 97-113; 2 James L. Strachan-Davidson, Problems of the Roman Criminal 
Law 156-58 (photo. reprint 1991) (1912). 
22. See Jones, supra note 11, at 84. 
23. See id. at 69; Strachan-Davidson, supra note 21, at 97. 
24. See Cicero, Pro Fiacco 2.4 (59 B.C.E.), in Cicero, The Speeches 360, 364 note a 
(Louis E. Lord trans., 1937). 
25. See Geib, supra note 14, at 367; Jones, supra note 11, at 45, 72-73; Kunkel, supra 
note 11, at 68. 
26. See 2 Emilio Costa, Cicerone Giureconsulto 143 (2d ed. 1927); Greenidge, supra 
note 16, at 477; Mommsen, supra note 11, at 431. 
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placed under an oath to tell the truth,28 and they were subjected to 
direct and cross-examination.29 In the early part of the period, par-
ties or counsel questioned the witnesses,3° and the judge generally 
played a passive role. He could control questioning and the 
number of witnesses, but he did not admit or exclude evidence.3l 
During the latter part of the period, the judge became increasingly 
active, joining in the examination of the witnesses32 and replacing 
the jury as factfinder.33 
No rules of evidence 
Rule-bound limits on the kinds of proof receivable at trial had 
not yet emerged in this period.34 No legislation or binding judicial 
authority treated the question of how a party could or could not 
prove his case.35 There was no formal theory of evidence, and no 
rules restricted factfinders in what they could consider of the vari-
ous types of proof set before them.36 Nor did a judgment require 
any particular standard of proof.37 In one of Cicero's rare appear-
ances as a prosecutor, he gave an indication of how broad the 
range of proofs could be. At the trial of Verres, he announced: 
"Now let us accuse this man [of corruption in office] with docu-
ments, witnesses, private and public letters and authorities. »38 
27. See Gerardo Broggini, La Preuve dans I'ancien Droit romain, in 1 La Preuve 223. 
276 (Recueils de 1a Societe Jean Bodin No. 16, 1964); Jolowicz & Nicholas, supra note 13. 
at 185; Kunkel, supra note 11, at 67. 
28. See Geib, supra note 14. at 332; Giovanni Pugliese, La Preu\'e dans Ie procCs romain 
de l'epoque classique, in 1 La Preuve. supra note 27, at 277. 317. 323-31. 
29. See Kunkel, supra note 11, at 68. 
30. See id; Pugliese, supra note 28, at 318. 
31. See Greenidge, supra note 16, at 495; Kunkel. supra note 11. at 68; Mommsen. supra 
note 11, at 421-22; Pugliese, supra note 28, at 318. 
32. See Geib, supra note 14, at 631-32; Jones, supra note 11. at 113-14; Mommsen. supra 
note 11, at 422. 
33. See W.W. Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian 662-64 
(3d ed. 1966); Jones, supra note 11, at 97; Mommsen, supra note 11, at 447. 
34. See Buckland, supra note 33, at 637; Geib, supra note 14, at 327; Jean Philippe Uvy, 
La fonnation de la tMorie romaine des preuves, in Studi in onore di Siro Solazzi 418, 420, 
424, 430 (1948); Strachan-Davidson. supra note 21, at 121-22; Pugliese. supra note 28, at 
306. 
35. See Uvy, supra note 34. at 420. 
36. See id. at 430. 
37. See Geib, supra note 14, at 335. 
38. "[N]unc hominem tabulis, testibus, privatis publicisque lineris auctorilalibusque 
accusemus." Cicero, In Verrem 1.11.33 (70 B.C.E.). reprinted in 1 Cicero, The Verrine 
Orations 68, 98-100 (L.H.G. Greenwood trans .• 1928). 
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Hearsay employed for whatever value the factfinder might 
attribute to it 
[Vol. 36:1 
In this vacuum of evidentiary limits, nothing prevented a party 
from using hearsay as a means of proof. Of course, its use reveals 
nothing about its efficacy. Cicero's speeches bristle with instances 
of the accuser or the accused relying upon hearsay evidence. Cic-
ero, for example, acting in his more customary role as defense 
counsel, had to protect Plancius, charged with corrupting an elec-
tion, against witnesses for the accuser who testified to oral state-
ments they had heard, including reports and rumors of Plancius's 
corrupt practices.39 
Proof could also include a wide variety of written hearsay.4o A 
party might offer private letters that bore directly on factual issues 
in the case.41 For instance, when Flaccus, whom Cicero defended, 
was accused of extortion, the accuser relied upon private letters in 
which the aggrieved author had complained to his mother and sis-
ter that Flaccus had extorted fifty talents from him. The writer of 
the letters never testified.42 
Public letters from entire communities provided another means 
of written proof. Usually the group's representative (legate) 
presented these letters, and they typically conveyed the character 
of a party or the community'S grievances.43 Parties also produced 
written declarations at trial from persons who did not appear in 
person. These deponents gave statements outside of trial with 
authenticating witnesses present but in the absence of the opposing 
party.44 Official documents, books and accounts could likewise be 
put forward.45 
The factfinder was free to evaluate these various types of hear-
say evidence for their probative value, like any other evidence 
presented in this period. Roman law had not yet established the 
39. See Cicero, Pro Plancio 23.57 (54 B.C.E.), in The Speeches, supra note 12, at 406, 
480-82. 
40. See Greenidge, supra note 16, at 274-75, 488-91, 493; Max Kaser, Testimonium, in 
9A Paulys Real-Encycloplidie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft cols. 1021, 1027-29, 
1051-52 (Wilhelm Kroll & Karl Mittelhaus eds., 1934) [hereinafter Real-Encyc1oplidie]. 
41. See Real-Encycloplidie, supra note 40, cols. 1051-52. 
42. See Cicero, Pro Fiacco 36.90-37.93, supra note 24, at 460-65. 
43. See Greenidge, supra note 16, at 489-91; Real-Encycloplidie, supra note 40, cols. 
1052-53. 
44. See Greenidge, supra note 16, at 488; Real-Encycloplidie, supra note 40, cols. 1028, 
1051-52. 
45. See Greenidge, supra note 16, at 493-95. 
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principle that a witness's testimony had to be given at trial and had 
to be based on firsthand knowledge. 
III. THE BASES FOR HOSTILITY TO HEARSAY IN THE 
CLASSICAL PERIOD 
Notwithstanding this absence of evidentiary limits, the use of 
hearsay clashed with fundamental principles of Roman factfinding. 
Roman trial procedure valued most highly live testimony from \vit-
nesses who had personal knowledge of facts and who swore to 
them under oath, while subject to cross-examination by opposing 
counselor, later, by the judge.46 Hearsay evidence was the antithe-
sis of such live, sworn, in-court testimony. Consequently, the use 
of hearsay was already at odds with the legal environment even 
before any rule of evidence developed to bar it. 47 
Emphasis on live testimony 
Then, as now, live testimony provided the best proof of a matter 
in issue.48 Quintilian (c. 35-110 C.E.), the leading Roman rhetori-
cian of the period, was also an experienced trial practitioner.49 He 
addressed his treatise, The Institutes of Oratory (c. 95 C.E.), to law-
yers who wished to know how to prove their cases. Quintilian 
heavily stressed the use of live testimony. He also devoted detailed 
attention to the presentation of witnesses.so Frequently, he looked 
to Cicero as a model in this regard. Quintilian warned that reliance 
upon the writing of an absent witness is likely to meet \vith defeat. 
"It is easier to repel written evidence"sl than live, he advised, 
because an adversary can point out that an absent declarant is 
likely to have less difficulty hiding his shame before a few persons 
who attest to his document than he would when he faced a 
46. See id. at 482; Jolowicz & Nicholas, supra note 13, at 185; Real·Encycloptldie, supra 
note 40, cols. 1051-53. 
47. See Buckland, supra note 33, at 637; Geib, supra note 14, at 335; Mommsen. supra 
note 11. at 411, 440; Salvatore Messina. La testimonianza nel processo penale romano. 73 
Rivista Penale 278. 292-93 (1911); Real·Encyc\opadie. supra note 40, col. 1053. 
48. See 2 Costa. supra note 26, at 144; Greenidge. supra note 16, at 272-74; Real· 
Encyclopadie, supra note 40, cols. 1046, 1051. 
49. For brief biographies of Quintilian, see James J. Murphy. Introduction to Quintilian 
on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing ix, xiv·xviii (James J. Murphy ed., 1987); The 
Oxford Classical Dictionary 907 (2d ed. 1970). 
50. See infra text accompanying notes 85·89. For Quintilian's complete exposition of 
how witnesses should be examined, see Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 5.7.3·37 (c. 95 C.E.). 
in 2 The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian 170·91 (H.E. Butler trans., 1921). 
51. "Simplicior contra tabulas pugna." Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 5.7.1, supra note 
50, at 168. 
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factfinder. Moreover, a jury is likely to consider the declarant's 
absence as a sign that he lacks confidence in his testimony. 52 
Quintilian's reasoning makes clear that the witness's presence 
was valued, at least in part, for the opportunity it offered the 
factfinder to observe demeanor and to use it as a measure of credi-
bility. Cicero frequently made the same point, calling the jury's 
attention to the details of how a witness comported himself when 
testifying. In defense of Flaccus, for example, Cicero asked the 
jurors (in making their decision whether to believe accusing wit-
nesses) to scrutinize the expressions on the witnesses' faces and to 
recognize that they spoke in an impudent tone.53 He reminded the 
jury how one witness, as he testified, was angry, shame-faced, trem-
bling and pale.54 Another was irate, yet hesitant as he spoke.55 
Direct exposure of a live witness also gave the factfinder an 
opportunity to determine whether the witness appreciated the 
gravity of the occasion. Arguing that one witness appeared too 
casual, Cicero asked the jury: "Does Indutiomarus [the witness] 
know what it is to testify? Is he moved by the same fear that would 
move each one of us, when he is brought into that place [the wit-
ness box]?"56 An incautious witness, in an unguarded moment of 
candor, might also let slip a word that revealed his bias or lack of 
restraint. 57 Such subtle and telling demeanor, which could only be 
observed when the witness appeared directly before the factfinder, 
helped the jury decide whether the witness's testimony was believ-
able. "Therefore, see with what expression on their face, with what 
audacity they speak; then you will know with what trustworthiness 
they testify."58 
The absence of the declarant, of course, made it impossible for 
the jury to judge truthfulness on the basis of facial expression, tone, 
earnestness or spontaneity. Cicero was quick to condemn an 
accuser who relied on hearsay in place of live witnesses. He dis-
missed the hearsay letters against Flaccus with acid rhetoric: 
52. ld. 
53. See Cicero, Pro FIacco 4.10, supra note 24, at 376. 
54. Id. 
55. See id. 4.11. 
56. "Scit Indutiomarus, quid sit testimonium dicere? Movetur eo tim ore, quo nostrum 
unus quisque, cum in eum locum productus est?" Cicero, Pro Fonteio 27 (c. 70 B.C.E.), in 
Cicero, The Speeches 308, 334 (N.H. Watts trans., 1958). 
57. See id. 28, at 334-36. 
58. "Haque videte quo vultu, qua confidentia dicant; tum intellegetis qua religione 
dicant." Cicero, Pro FIacco 4.10, supra note 24, at 376. 
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But the charge made by Flacidius [the author of the let-
ters] is remarkable; he says he gave fifty talents to Flac-
cus. Let us hear the man. He is not present. How, then, 
does he speak? His mother proffers a letter and his sister 
another; they say he wrote them and that he gave a great 
deal of money to Flaccus. . .. [W]hy do we not hear him 
himself? . . . Did you think you could prove so great a 
charge, Decianus, by having letters recited and merely 
these women produced, while the praised writer was 
absent ... ?59 
9 
Ironically, the strength of the factfinder's expectation of live tes-
timony and the common distrust of hearsay are revealed by the 
elaborate measures Cicero took to excuse his own use of hearsay in 
the defense of another of his clients, Roscius Comedus.60 The 
accuser claimed Roscius owed him money. Cicero wished to show 
the accuser had already been paid.61 There was no eyewitness 
available to testify. The defense, therefore, was reduced to relying 
upon the hearsay statement of someone who claimed he had heard 
an eyewitness report of the payment.62 Cicero labored to justify his 
use of such secondary evidence. His explanation to the jury was 
not unlike that of a modem American practitioner who argues to a 
judge that some hearsay should be allowed because it is necessary 
and reliable.63 Cicero first insisted that no direct witness to the 
payment was available to be called before the jury.64 Second, he 
argued that his absent declarant was a judge, a knight, a man with-
out bias whose probity the opposing party himself had once 
accepted.65 Third, he explained that the declarant knew the gods 
would punish him if he lied, even though he was not under oath.66 
59. At Flacidianum crimen est ingens; talenta quinquaginta se FIacco dicit dedisse. 
Audiamus hominem. Non adest. Quo modo igitur dicit. Epistulam mater eius 
profert at aiteram soror; scriptum ad se dicunt esse ab iIIo tamam pecuniam 
Fiacco datam .... [C]ur non audimus ipsum? ... His tu igitur epistulis, Deciane, 
recitatis, his mulierculis productis. iIIo absente auctore laudato tantum te crimen 
probaturum putasti ... ? 
rd. 36.90-93, at 460-62. 
60. See Cicero, Pro Roscio Comoedo (c. 66 B.C.E.), in Cicero, The Speeches 274 (John 
H. Freese trans., 1930). 
61. rd. 14.41, at 312. 
62. rd. 14.42-43, at 312-14. 
63. See Fed. R Evid. 803(24), 804(b)(5). 
64. Cicero, Pro Roscio Comoedo 14.42, supra note 60, at 312. 
65. rd. 
66. rd. 16.46, at 316-17. For a discussion of the oath requirement, see infra [ext 
accompanying notes 74-80. 
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In short, Cicero claimed the hearsay was trustworthy. His 
extended excuses for the use of hearsay were made to a jury that 
anticipated meeting a declarant face-to-face and that received 
hearsay skeptically. 
The importance of personal knowledge 
An advocate's strongest proof was a witness testifying from per-
sonal knowledge.67 In Cicero's defense of Archia68 against a 
charge that he was not a citizen, Cicero announced to the jury that 
he would produce an eyewitness in support of his client: "There is 
present a man of the greatest authority, trustworthiness and credi-
bility, M. Lucullus, who says that he does not think, but knows, not 
that he heard, but saw, not that he was only present, but that he 
was active."69 Conversely, Cicero poured scorn on witnesses who 
testified not from personal observation but on the basis of reports 
they received from others. In urging the jury to reject the hearsay 
used against the allegedly corrupt Plancius, Cicero argued: "But 
nothing is so fleet as an evil report; nothing is sent about more 
easily, nothing is picked up more quickly, nothing spreads more 
widely. "70 It was not the bad report the jurors should consider, but 
rather the actual source of it. When the source remained 
unknown, Cicero urged the jurors to reject it: a witness who testi-
fies that "I heard" relates nothing more than "the voice of the 
mob. "71 "The report of the people" and "the testimony of the mul-
titude," Cicero argued, constitute the type of evidence which "truth 
itself can hardly refute. "72 Failure to establish truth in a reliable 
manner created the risk that innocent persons would be convicted. 
Indeed, the community itself was imperiled if this type of hearsay 
were to be the basis of a judgment: "One thing I greatly ask and 
beg of you, jurors, where there is danger here not only to the man I 
defend, but to the community, do not think to subject the fortunes 
67. See Greenidge, supra note 16, at 482; Real-Encycloplldie, supra note 40, col. 1046. 
68. See Cicero, Pro Archia Poeta (62 B.C.E.), in The Speeches, supra note 12, at 6. 
69. "Adest vir summa auctoritate et religione et fide, M. Lucullus, qui se non opinari, 
sed scire, non audisse, sed vidisse, non interfuisse, sed egisse dicit." Id. 4.8, at 14. 
70. "Nihil est autem tam volucre, quam maledictum; nihil facilius emittitur, nihil citius 
excipitur, nihillatius dissipatur." Cicero, Pro Plancio '23.57, supra note 39, at 480. 
71. "[I]lIa vox vulgaris, audivi." Id. at 482. 
72. "[Q]uod genus refutare interdum veritas vix potest. Huius etiam est generis fama 
vulgi, quoddam multitudinis testimonium." Cicero, Topica 20.76 (44 B.C.E), in Cicero, De 
Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica 382, 440 (H.M. Hubbell trans., 1949). 
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of the innocent to fictitious hearsay [auditiones] or to common talk 
which has been seeded and scattered about."73 
The need for testimony under oath 
Roman procedure required witnesses at trial to testify under 
oath.74 The oath strongly enhanced veracity. Cicero made 
repeated claims for the reliability of evidence on the authority of 
the oath: "Q. Minucius, having been sworn, says the money was 
paid,"75 or "You will hear from persons under oath."76 On the 
other hand, a witness's failure to recognize the serious obligation of 
the oath warranted rejecting his testimony. Cicero called upon the 
jury to disregard the witnesses against Flaccus because they treated 
their oath like a joke and their testimony like a game.77 
Cicero seized upon the conflict of hearsay with the oath require-
ment1s as an additional argument for dismissing the hearsay letters 
against Flaccus: "Will he [the author], then, unsworn, whom no one 
would believe if he held the altar [to make an oath], prove what he 
wishes by using a letter?"79 On the same ground Quintilian dispar-
aged hearsay: "For we know testimonies of whole nations as well as 
entire classes of testimonies have been made light of by orators; as 
with hearsay statements [auditionibus]; for [it ,vill be said] those 
[testifying] are not themselves witnesses but relate the voices of the 
unsworn."so Thus the unsworn nature of hearsay constituted 
73. "mud unum vos magnopere oro atque obsecro, iudices, cum huius, quem defendo, 
tum communis periculi causa, ne fictis auditionibus, ne disseminato dispersoque sermoni 
fartunas innocentium subiiciendas putetis." Cicero, Pro Plancio 2356, supra note 39, at 
480. 
74. Pugliese, supra note 28, at 317: Real-Encyclopfldie, supra note 40, col. 1051. 
75. "0. Minucius, iuratus dicit pecuniam datam ••. :' Cicero, In Verrem 2.33.80, supra 
note 38, at 380. 
76. "[A]udietis ex iuratis." Cicero, Pro Caelio 2.4, in Cicero, The Speeches 410 (R. 
Gardner trans., 1958). 
77. Cicero, Pro Fiacco 4.12, supra note 24, at 378. 
78. It was possible for a declaration made outside of trial to be sworn. "[O]rdinary 
private evidence was also accepted in written form. The witness had to take an oath and 
write out his testimony in the presence of sworn witnesses, who affixed their seals." Jones, 
supra note 11, at 71-72; see Pugliese, supra note 28, at 317. Such evidence. however. was 
easily derided if the declarant was absent at trial. See Buckland, supra note 33, al 637; see 
also supra text accompanying notes 51-52. 
79. "Ergo is, qui si aram tenens iuraret, crederet nemo, per epistulam quod volet 
iniuratus probabit?" Cicero, Pro Fiacco 36.90, supra nole 24, al 460. 
80. "Nam et gentium simul universarum elevata testimonia ab oratoribus scimus et tota 
genera testimoniorum: ut de auditionibus; non enim ipsos esse testes sed iniuralorum 
adferre voces .... " Ouintilian, Institutio oratoria 5.75, supra note 50, al 170. 
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another of its principal defects, even in an age without rules of 
evidence. 
The importance of examining witnesses 
Finally, hearsay could not find any secure place in the Roman 
trial environment because it violated the system's expectation that 
witnesses would be subjected to probing examination.81 In the first 
years of the classical period, this questioning took place much like 
that in a modern American courtroom, where parties are subjected 
to cross-examination by their opponents before the jury. In the 
later part of the period, the judge actively examined the wit-
nesses.82 This role increased to such a degree that the judge, sitting 
with a council of advisors, replaced the jury-courts.83 Regardless of 
who asked the questions or found the facts, however, Roman pro-
cedure greatly stressed the role of witness examination to test 
credibility. 
During Cicero's time, parties or advocates still asked the ques-
tions. Cicero recalled how rhetoricians praised cross-examination 
and how one advocate was remembered particularly for his ability 
to expose the witness candidly to the jury, even against the wit-
ness's will. "He interrogated the witness well; he attacked him 
heatedly and caught him; he led him where he wanted to; he 
refuted and rendered [the witness] speechless . . . ."84 
Quintilian also strongly emphasized the art of cross-examination. 
His instructions are as relevant today as when he first gave them at 
the end of the first century C.E. His masterful, extensive presenta-
tion reveals the essential role of cross-examination in the Roman 
trial. Quintilian's first rule was "to know the witness" who is to be 
examined.85 A party must carefully prepare his own witness for the 
important test of cross-examination. This preparation was to take 
place before trial to enable the witness to withstand the real thing 
81. See Jones, supra note 11, at 114 (noting the significant role of witness demeanor in 
the evaluation of testimony); see also Mommsen, supra note II, at 430·32; Messina, supra 
note 47, at 297; Pugliese, supra note 28, at 318. 
82. See Jones, supra note 11, at 113·14; Mommsen, supra note 11, at 430; Messina, supra 
note 47, at 297; Pugliese, supra note 28, at 318. 
83. See Kunkel, supra note 11, at 69·74; see also Jones, supra note 11, at 110, 113·14 
(explaining the mechanics of the senate as a court of law as well as the courts of the 
emperor). 
84. "'[B]ene testem interrogavit; callide accessit, reprehendit; quo voluit adduxit; 
convicit et elinguem rediddit' .... " Cicero, Pro Fiacco 10.22, supra note 24, at 390. 
85. "[P]rimum est nosse testem." Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 5.7.26, supra note 50, at 
182. 
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in front of the factfinder. The witness was not to appear timid, 
wavering or imprudent, because such a witness could be confused 
and led into snares by the opponent's counsel.86 The unprepared 
witness might well do more harm than the good that could be done 
by a steady and calm witness: "For a timid witness can be terror-
ized, a stupid one tricked, an irritable one excited, and a vain one 
puffed Up."S7 If the opposing witness clearly intended not to yield 
the truth, the cross-examiner would have to twist out of the witness 
what the witness was unwilling to give up voluntarily. This was 
best done by lengthy and repeated questioning. Eventually, the 
witness would say things he thought harmless, yet which would ine-
luctably make it impossible for him to deny the very thing he had 
never wanted to say. The reluctant witness would contradict him-
self and be forced to admit or recant.88 If counsel was unsure of 
the opposing witness's intentions, Quintilian counselled, then the 
cross-examiner should proceed step by step, by cautious degrees 
through seemingly innocuous and irrelevant questions until he 
secured from the witness what he desired.59 
Quintilian's elaboration of cross-examination could only have 
been written by an experienced advocate, who practiced within a 
system where the art of cross-examination was regularly displayed 
and where factfinders would expect testimony to be probed. 
Although factfinders could consider hearsay in this period, a skill-
ful advocate would encourage them to attach little weight to such 
untested evidence.90 
IV. THE INCEPTION OF A LIMIT TO WHAT EVIDENCE A 
FACfFINDER CoULD CoNSIDER 
The reign of the Emperor Hadrian (117-138 C.E.) marked a high 
point in the development of Roman jurisprudence.91 The emperor 
took great personal interest in improving the quality of justice and 
often sat as a judge himself.92 "Indeed, the Roman law of evidence 
owes a good deal to texts of his reign, and ... the legal principles 
86. See id. 5.7.10-11, at 172-74. 
87. "Nam timidus terreri, stultus decipi, iracundus concitari, ambitiosus inflari potest 
.... " Id. 5.7.26, at 182. 
88. See id. 5.7.17, at 176-78. 
89. See id. 5.7.20, at 178. 
90. See Buckland, supra note 33, at 637; 2 Costa, supra note 26, at 146; Greenidge, supra 
note 16, at 482; Mommsen, supra note 11, at 411, 440-41; Messina. supra note 47. at 292-93. 
91. See Kunkel, supra note 11, at 117. For a brief description of Hadrian's legislation. 
see P.E. Corbett, The Legislation of Hadrian, 74 U. Pa. L Rev. 753 (1926). 
92. See Tony Honore, Emperors and Lawyers 12-16 (2d ed. 1981). 
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can properly be ascribed to the emperor personally."93 Like his 
predecessors, Hadrian issued written answers to Roman officials 
who consulted him for legal guidance. These responses, called 
"rescripts," were usually drawn up in consultation with legal advi-
sors to the emperor.94 Several of Hadrian's rescripts focused on 
how a factfinder could evaluate witness testimony.95 Hadrian con-
firmed the broad freedom of factfinding judges to make judgments 
relying on their own consciences (ex sententia animi tui).96 With 
respect to assessing witness testimony, he explicitly declined to 
limit that discretion. In answer to a question from a provincial offi-
cial about how to determine the credibility of witnesses, Hadrian 
replied: 
What arguments are sufficient to each matter for a 
method of proof cannot be satisfactorily defined in any 
certain way. Often, though not always, the truth can be 
determined without public records of each matter. Some-
times the number of witnesses, sometimes dignity and 
authority, at other times a commonly held rumor confirms 
the credibility of a matter about which there is question. 
Therefore, in sum, this alone I can reply to you: certainly 
you should not immediately make a trial [cogn ition em] 
depend upon one type of proof, but you ought to draw 
conclusions from the opinion of your own self what you 
either believe or consider not sufficiently proven to yoU.97 
93. Id. at 12. 
94. See Kunkel, supra note 11, at 129. Statutory validity was assumed for the decisions 
contained in the rescripts. Id. at 128. An inferior judge who inquired about a legal issue 
was bound by the emperor's response. Id. at 129. For a detailed description of the Roman 
rescript system, see Honore, supra note 92, at 33-70. 
95. See Callistratus, De cognitionibus bk. 4 (1981211). Dig. 22.5.3 (533). in 1 Corpus Juris 
Civilis 327-28 (Theodor Mommsen & Paul Krueger eds., 22d ed. 1973) (quoting Rescript of 
Hadrian to Vibius Varus, legate to the province of Cilicia; Rescript of Hadrian to Valerius 
Verus; Rescript of Hadrian to lunius Rufinus, proconsul of Macedonia; Rescript of 
Hadrian to Gabinius Maximus). For the passage of Callistratus in the context of the 
reconstructed work, see 1 Palingenesia Juris Civilis cols. 81,88, para. 28 (Otto Lenel ed., 
Leipzig, Bernhard Tauchnitz 1889) [hereinafter Palingenesia]; see also Corbett, supra note 
91, at 766 (synopsizing Hadrian's rescripts on witnesses). 
96. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. 
97. Quae argumenta ad quem modum probandae cuique rei sufflciant, nullo certo 
modo satis definiri potest. sicut non semper, ita saepe sine publicis monumentis 
cui usque rei veritas deprehenditur. alias numerus testium, alias dignitas et 
auctoritas, alias veluti consentiens fama confirmat rei de qua quaeritur fidem. 
hoc ergo solum tibi rescribere possum summatim non utique ad un am probationis 
speciem cognitionem statim alligari debere, sed ex sent entia animi tui te 
aestimare oportere, quid aut credas aut parum probatum tibi opinaris. 
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In a similar vein, the emperor wrote to Vibius Varus, a legate in the 
province of Cilicia: 
You can know more how much credence is to be placed in 
the witnesses, who and of what dignity and of what repute 
they are, who are seen to speak candidly, whether they 
put forward one and the same studied talk or whether 
they respond truthfully and instantaneously to those mat-
ters which you question them about.98 
The emperor was speaking about witnesses who appeared before 
the factfinder. Only in such cases could the factfinder attend to the 
subtleties of phrasing and scrutinize the candor of a witness's 
response to questions, as the emperor directed. Because the 
factfinder was on the scene, he was in a position to make such 
refined assessments. The emperor, far removed from the court-
room, declined to limit the discretion of a factfinder who had the 
witness in front of him. 
When the witness did not appear in court, but sent written testi-
mony, the factfinder lost the immediacy of an encounter with the 
declarant. In such a case, Hadrian did not hesitate to establish a 
limit: 
The same divine Hadrian wrote to Iunius Rufinus, the 
proconsul of Macedonia, that witnesses themselves and 
not their written testimonies shall be believed. The words 
of the letter pertinent to this part are these: "Alexander 
brought up charges against Aper before me. Because he 
did not prove them or produce witnesses, but wanted to 
use written statements, which have no place in my court 
(for I am accustomed to question the witnesses them-
selves), I sent him back to the one presiding in that prov-
Rescript of Hadrian to Valerius Verus (117/38), quoted in Callistratus, De cognitionibus, 
supra note 95, Dig. 225.3.2 (533), at 327. "Cognitionemn may refer to the cognitio 
extraordinaria, originally a civil trial procedure in which an official used his powers to 
decide a case between private parties. See Jolowicz & Nicholas, supra note 13, at 397. In 
the first century C.E., the cognitio extraordinaria began "to supplant the 'ordinary' jurisdic-
tion of the jury-courts." Kunkel, supra note 11, at 70. In the rourse of the third century, 
the jury courts died out and "all civil and criminal proceedings came under the official 
cognitio." Id. at 143. 
98. "Th magis scire potes, quanta fides habenda sit testibus, qui et cuius dignitatis et 
cuius estimationis sint, et qui simpliciter visi sint dicere, utrum unum eundem que 
meditatum sermonem attulerint an ad ea quae interrogeueras ex tempore uerisimilia 
responderint." Rescript of Hadrian to Vibius Varus, supra note 95, at 327. 
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ince, so that he could inquire about the reliability of the 
witnesses . . . . "99 
Here Hadrian created a clear boundary.loo A factfinder was enti-
tled to weigh the testimony of a witness appearing before him 
because examination and observation could assure reliability. Tes-
timony submitted in writing eluded such probing. The emperor, 
therefore, instructed the factfinder to disregard such statements 
completely. The judge would have no difficulty following this 
directive. As factfinder, he did not even have to expose himself to 
the contents of the testimony. He could simply refuse to read the 
submission, which is apparently what Hadrian did. Other judges 
may have heard the testimony and then rejected it: "Lucius TItius 
brought a charge of insult against Gaius Seius and in that action he 
[TItius] recited written testimony before the praetorian prefect: the 
prefect, because he did not put credence in written testimony, pro-
nounced the judgment that Lucius TItius had suffered no insult 
from Gaius Seius."lOl Presumably the basis for Hadrian's instruc-
tion was not skepticism about the factfinder's ability to weigh evi-
dence for its proper worth, because one assumes that the emperor, 
who practiced his own rule, did not distrust himself. His rescript 
instead represents the statement of an extremely sophisticated 
judge, lawgiver and factfinder that evidence which cannot be ques-
99. Idem divus Hadrianus lunio Rufino proconsuli Macedoniae rescripsit testibus 
se, non testimoniis crediturum. verba epistulae ad hanc partem pertinentia haec 
sunt: 'Quod crimina obiecerit apud me Alexander Apro et quia non probabat nec 
testes producebat, sed testimoniis uti volebat, quibus apud me locus non est (nam 
ipsos interrogare soleo), quem remisi ad provinciae praesidem, ut is de fide 
testium quaereret ... .' 
Rescript of Hadrian to Iunius Rufinus, supra note 95, at 327-28. 
100. See Pugliese, supra note 28, at 320. 
101. "Lucius Titius crimen intendit Gaio Seio quasi iniuriam passus atque in earn rem 
testation em apud praefectum praetorio recitauit: praefectus fide non habita testationis 
nullam iniuriam Lucium Titium passum esse a Gaio Seio pronuntiavit." Paulus, 
Responsorum Iibri xxiii, bk. 2 (2181235), Dig. 32.21 (533), in 1 Corpus luris Civilis, supra 
note 95, at 67. For the passage of Paulus in the context of the reconstructed work, see 1 
Palingenesia, supra note 95, cols. 1223, 1225, para. 1450. For the translation of "crimen ... 
quasi iniuriam" as "insult," see 1 The Digest of Justinian, supra note 1, at 86. 
The court over which the praetorian prefect presided was the highest in the empire. See 
Alan Watson, Glossary to 1 The Digest of Justinian, supra note 1, at xv, xxiv. For a 
description of the praetorian prefect's place in Roman administration, see Jolowicz & 
Nicholas, supra note 13, at 334-35. 
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tioned should have "no place" in the formation of a legal 
judgment.102 
Hadrian's rescript had lasting influence. Imperial responses to 
official inquiries were often used not only as an answer in a single 
case but as a general model of correct procedure.loo After 
Hadrian, the third-century jurist Callistratus (2111217) preserved 
this rescript in his book, De cognitionibus,l04 thereby making it 
available to students, jurists and practitioners. lOS Through Callis-
tratus, the rescript eventually passed into the great sixth-century 
compendium of Roman law, the legislation of Justinian. 
v. JUSTINIAN'S LEGISLATION 
At Constantinople, the Emperor Justinian (527-565) issued his 
monumental codification of Roman law intending to record the 
governing law of the Empire in an organized, permanent fash-
ion.106 The legislation was composed of several parts: the Digest 
(excerpts from earlier influential jurists) (533), the Institutes (a 
textbook for law students) (533), and the Codex, or Code (a collec-
tion of laws from earlier emperors, with obsolete passages 
removed) (534).107 After 534 Justinian supplemented the Code 
102. The rationale for Hadrian's rejection of written hearsay would also apply to oral 
statements from absent persons, but no rescripts are preserved to indicate whether the 
emperor in fact extended his logic to such testimony. 
103. Kunkel, supra note 11, at 129. 
104. De cognitionihus deals with the trial procedure of the cogniliones exlTaordinariae. 
See supra note 97; Jolowicz & Nicholas, supra note 13, at 392. 
105. It is conjectured that jurists such as Callistratus may have formed aristocratic clubs, 
or "schools," for the discussion of legal matters. See Jolowicz & Nicholas, supra note 13, at 
380. 
106. Since the sixteenth century, Justinian's compilation has been referred to as the 
Corpus Iuris Civilis. See Kunkel, supra note 11, at 168. For the stereotype edition, see 
Corpus Iuris Civilis, supra note 95. For detailed accounts of how the Corpus Iuris was 
compiled, see Buckland, supra note 33, at 40-47; Jolowicz & Nicholas, supra note 13, at 
478-98; Paul KrUger, Geschichte der Quellen und Litteratur des ROmischen Rechts 365-92 
(2d ed. 1912). 
107. Although the Code was originally issued in 529, only the restatement or 534 
remains. See Jolowicz & Nicholas, supra note 13, at 479. 
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with new laws (constitutiones), called the Novels,lOB designed to fill 
gaps in the Code and to take account of new legal developments.109 
In his compilation, Justinian treated the testimony of witnesses 
as a unified subject. This marked a significant advance over earlier 
Roman law, which had not given any organized consideration to 
means of proof yo The Digest, the Code and the Novels each 
devoted a section to witness testimony. Although these sections 
did not create a system of rules of evidence, they provided many 
directives governing testimony.1l1 
To ensure that the factfinder could scrutinize statements of wit-
nesses, Justinian required the witnesses to testify in their own voice 
under oath.1l2 In civil cases, the factfinding judge could excuse a 
witness's presence only if exceptional hardship existed such as age, 
sickness, military duty or distance from the courtY3 If the witness 
lived outside the jurisdiction, a judge in the witness's locality would 
depose the witness.114 The examining judge would then send the 
deposition to the judge having original jurisdiction over the case.11S 
The opposing party had the opportunity to be present at the depo-
108. The Novels are printed in 3 Corpus luris Civilis (Rudolf SchOll & Wilhelm Kroll 
eds., 10th ed. 1972), with the original Greek in the left-hand columns and a Latin 
translation in the right-hand columns. The translation probably dates from the sixth 
century and is known as the Authenticum, because some scholars of the later Middle Ages 
considered it to be Justinian's official collection. See Jolowicz & Nicholas, supra note 13, at 
498. The translation generally is word-for-word from the Greek. See KrUger, supra note 
106, at 402. 
109. Jolowicz & Nicholas, supra note 13, at 496. 
110. See Levy, supra note 34, at 433-34. 
111. See Dig. 22.5 (533), in 1 Corpus luris Civilis, supra note 95, at 328; Code J. 4.20 
(534), in 2 Corpus luris Civilis 158 (paul Krueger ed., 15th ed. 1970); Nov. 90 (539), in 3 
Corpus luris Civilis, supra note 108. at 449. 
112. See Code J. 4.20.16 (c. 527). in 2 Corpus luris Civilis, supra note 111, at 159. 
Justinian's law (constitutio) addressed trials at Constantinople. If the witnesses were 
outside the imperial city. the parties could send representatives to depose them. Id. 
113. See Dig. 22.5.3.6, 22.5.8 (533), in 1 Corpus luris Civilis, supra note 95, at 328. 
114. "[W]e know a law has long existed that if someone brings a case here [in 
Constantinople] but needs to establish proof in some part of a province, it is permitted to 
produce the witnesses within the province (a judge deciding this and determining a 
sufficient continuance) and to return the case here after the matters have been done and 
the case to be decided by the original judge .... " ("[S]cimus dudum factam legem, ut si 
quis hic litem exercet, oportet autem in provinciae parte aliqua adprobari, licentiam habere 
iudice hoc decernente et sufficiens temp oris spatium definiente deducere intra provinciam 
testes et huc transmittere litem gestis perlatis et ab eodem iudicari iudice .... ") Nov. 90.5 
(version of Authenticum), in 3 Corpus luris Civilis, supra note 108, at 450. The constjllltfo 
extends this procedure to cases brought in any province. Id. 
115. ld. 
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sition.116 This procedure resembles modem American provisions 
for the use of prerecorded testimony.117 In criminal cases, how-
ever, the presence of witnesses before the presiding judge was 
strictly required.lls Thus, the normal practice in both civil and 
criminal cases was for a witness to testify live before the factfinder. 
In the Digest, Justinian also adopted Hadrian's rescript rejecting 
written testimony.119 
These passages, taken together, insisted that witness testimony 
be subject to the factfinder's examination.l20 Their terms, how-
ever, did not clearly prevent reliance upon oral derivative testi-
mony. Although the reception of such hearsay may have violated 
the logic of Hadrian's rescript, Justinian's texts only required \vit-
nesses to be present in court to testify. They did not unambigu-
ously preclude secondary oral testimony. This would have 
involved the additional requirement that in-court witnesses testify 
solely on the basis of personal knowledge. Although the Code 
required witnesses to testify "about what they know,"121 it did not 
mandate that such knowledge be based on firsthand observation. 
Apparently it was still possible for a judge, as factfinder. to rely 
upon secondary oral evidence. 
In at least one instance, however, Justinian warned that what a 
witness overheard was not to be relied upon at all.l22 This passage 
merits special attention. It marks the first formal rejection of oral 
116. "[I]t is fitting that he [the prospective adverse party] living in the city in which 
testimonies are given, be advised by the judge or defensor to be present and to hear 
testimony." ("[O]portet et ilium in ea civitate constitutum in qua testationes dantur, 
admonitum a iudice sive defensore praesentem esse et audire adtestationes.") Nov. 90.9 
(version of Authenticum), in 3 Corpus Iuris Civilis, supra note 108. at 452. A defensor was 
a municipal official invested with minor powers of jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters. 
See Jolowicz & Nicholas, supra note 13, at 430, 446-47. 
117. See Fed. R. Evid. 804{b){1). 
118. "Understanding all these things [i.e., provisions for taking the testimony of 
witnesses before a court not having jurisdiction of the case] in pecuniary [i.e .• civil] matters; 
for in criminal [matters], in which there is danger concerning great things. by all means 
witnesses are to be present before the judges and tell of those things that are knO\\ll to 
them .... " ("Haec omnia in pecuniariis quaestionibus intellegentes; in criminalibus enim. 
in quibus de magnis est periculum, omnibus modis apud iudices praesentari testes et quae 
sunt eis cognita edocere .... ") Nov. 905.1 (version of Authenticum). in 3 Corpus Iuris 
Civilis, supra note 108, at 451. The constitulio allows for the witnesses to be tortured to 
obtain the truth from them. Id. 
119. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
120. See Geib, supra note 14, at 630. 
121. "[Q]uod noverint" Code J. 4.20.16.1, in 2 Corpus Iuris Civilis. supra no Ie Ill, at 
159. 
122. See Nov. 90.2 (539), in 3 Corpus Iuris Civilis. supra nole lOS. al 447. 
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hearsay in Roman law, however narrow its setting.123 The passage 
also became a touchstone for later medieval jurists in constructing 
a more elaborate edifice against derivative oral testimony.124 
Justinian's Novel 90.2125 clearly commanded factfinders to give 
no credence to testimony that a written debt had been paid or was 
owed if the testimony was based on hearsay: 
[T]hose empty testimonies, based on passing by, and ficti-
tious testimonies of this sort, are by no means to be 
accorded any value, as when someone, coming along on 
some business or other, hears some people saying that 
they received money from someone or owed it to some-
one: for these [testimonies] clearly are suspect to us and 
not worthy of any credit.126 
By placing his rejection of such oral hearsay within formallegisla-
tion, albeit in a limited context, Justinian raised the scrutiny of such 
evidence to a new level. The rejection had now become part of a 
corpus of law, and it would be carefully studied when Roman law 
was revived in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries.127 
Justininan's legislation was introduced into Italy wherever 
Roman law was in effect. l28 Although knowledge of the Digest dis-
appeared129 until a full manuscript was discovered in the late elev-
enth century,130 the Code continued to be known at least in a 
123. See Buckland, supra note 33, at 662; GA. Morrison, Some Features of the Roman 
and the English Law of Evidence, 33 Thl. L. Rev. 577, 587 (1959). 
124. See infra text accompanying notes 249-52. 
125. See Nov. 90.2, in 3 Corpus Iuris Civilis, supra note 108, at 447. 
126. "Haec autem inania et ex transitu perhibita testimonia nulla modis omnibus valere 
ratione, et huiusmodi quaedam fingere testimonia, ut propter aliud quoddam opus 
adveniens audiat ali quos dicentes accepisse ab aliquo aurum aut deb ere alicui: haec 
namque aperte nobis suspecta sunt et nullius digna ratione." Id. The hearsay reports were 
untrustworthy because the witness had only casually overheard the hearsay. Justinian 
allowed the hearsay testimony if witnesses of high repute had been formally gathered to 
hear a creditor acknowledge payment. Id. 
127. See infra text accompanying notes 241-52. 
128. Roman law was mainly in effect in the south due to the Lombards' conquest of 
northern Italy. See Wolff, supra note 10, at 183. Indeed, until at least the ninth century 
Italy was the only area where Justinian's law governed. See KrUger, supra note 106, at 418. 
For an overview of Roman legal influence outside Italy through the twelfth century, see 
Wolff, supra note 10, at 183-85. 
129. See Mauro Cappelletti et aI., The Italian Legal System 11 (1967); Kunkel, supra 
note 11, at 181. 
130. See Jolowicz & Nicholas, supra note 13, at 491; Wolff, supra note 10, at 186. 
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reduced form.131 The Novels, too, were circulated, principally 
through a Latin summary by Julian, a law teacher at Constanti-
nople. The Epitome Iuliani132 was probably intended to guide 
judges in Italy, where it was known throughout the Middle Ages.l33 
Julian's strong phrasing of Justinian's bar against casually over-
heard statements has a particularly familiar ring to the Anglo-
American ear: "[F]or we do not admit testimonies [non enim 
admittimus testimonia] of those who are accustomed to say that, in 
passing by, they heard someone saying that money was paid to 
him."134 Regardless of a judge's general freedom as factfinder, the 
Epitome left no room for the judge to consider the kind of oral 
hearsay that Justinian rejected. 
VI. CANONICAL BACKGROUND AND THE REJEcrION OF 
HEARSAY BY POPE GREGORY THE GREAT 
The classical Roman preference for live testimony, Hadrian's 
rejection of written testimony and Justinian's hostility to oral hear-
say were all based on Roman mistrust of any evidence the 
factfinder could not test. There was no mention, however. that 
hearsay violated any binding judicial order of procedure. This may 
be explained because no order of procedure existed in the sense of 
an organized, written summary of how a trial was to be 
conducted:135 
It is striking that in Roman law apparently no great worth 
was laid upon a clearly arranged summary of the many 
isolated regulations over the course of procedure. In any 
event, no trace of an effort has been handed down from 
131. See Cappelletti et al., supra note 129, at 11; Kunkel, supra note 11, at 181. 
Justinian's Institutes were also known in their entirety. See Cappelletti et aI., supra note 
129, at 12. 
132. For the text, see Iuliani Epitome latina NoveUarum Iustiniani (Gustav Haenel ed., 
Leipzig, Hinrichs 1873) [hereinafter Iuliani Epitome). 
133. See Kunkel, supra note 11, at 175; J.A. Clarence Smith, Medieval Law Teachers and 
Writers: Civilian and Canonist 3 (1975). 
134. "[N]on enim admittimus testimonia eorum, qui dicere solent, transeuntes se audisse 
aliquem dicentem pecuniam sibi solutam esse." Iuliani Epitome 83.324, supra note 132, at 
110. In revived Roman law studies in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a creditor'S 
overheard admission that he had been paid would become admissible. See infra text 
accompanying note 305. 
135. The Roman jurists did not clearly separate procedural law from substantive law. 
CalIistratus's De cognitionibus, supra note 95, is one of the few exceptions. Sec Studies in 
the Glossators of the Roman Law 72 (Hermann Kantorowicz & William Wamick 
Buckland eds., Scientia Verlag 1969) (1938) ("If [the Romans) ever wrote comprehensive 
monographs on procedure as a whole, these have certainly not come down to us •... "). 
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which to show that a clearly arranged summary was 
attempted.136 
If no set written procedure existed, it is not surprising that the 
Roman texts opposed hearsay but never stated that its use violated 
the integrity of a judicial process as such. 
In contrast, the Church, at the start of the seventh century, 
articulated a simplified summary of its judicial practice.137 This 
occurred against the background of long-standing ecclesiastical 
interest in fair process. Understanding the Church's traditional 
stress on proper procedure is significant because it was in this con-
text that the rejection of derivative testimony would eventually 
make its first appearance in ecclesiastical law. 
An early attempt to formulate a procedure for settling disputes 
within the Church appears in the Didascalia,138 composed in the 
third century by an unknown author,139 which guided ecclesiastical 
judges in resolving disputes among church members.14o According 
to the Didascalia, a judge could render a judgment only if both 
parties had been carefully heard,141 the accuser first. 142 The judge 
also had to give the accused an opportunity to defend himself.143 
In the fourth century, Pope Liberius staunchly supported the 
integrity of process by refusing, even in the face of imperial threats, 
to endorse a church synod's judgment made without following 
136. Linda Fowler-Magerl, Ordo iudiciorum vel ordo iudiciarius 9 (Ius Commune, 
Sonderhefte No. 19, 1984). 
137. See infra text accompanying note 162. 
138. For the text, see Didascalia, in 1 Didascalia et Constitutiones apostolorum 2 (Franz 
X. Funk ed., 1905). The Latin text is a translation of the original Greek, which is now lost. 
See Franz X. Funk, Prolegomena to 1 Didascalia et Constitutiones apostolorum, supra. at i, 
vi. For an English translation, see Didascalia Apostolorum (R. Hugh Connolly ed. & 
trans., 1929). 
139. The work is believed to date from c. 230. Jean Gaudemet, Les Sources du droit de 
l'Eglise en Occident du II" au VIle siecJe 24 (1985). The author was perhaps a bishop in the 
area of Antioch. Id. "Because of its size and content, [the Didascalia] is considered as the 
first attempt at a code of canon law." Constant van de Wiel, History of Canon Law 38 
(1991). 
Jewish talmudic practice may have influenced the procedure of the Didascalia. See 
Artur Steinwenter, Der antike kirchliche Rechtsgang und seine Quellen, 54 Zeitschrift der 
Savigny-Stiftung fUr Rechtsgeschichte, Kanonistiche Abteilung 23, at I, 93-94 (1934). The 
author of the Didascalia knew of Jewish tracts and appreciated the customs of the 
synagogues. Id. Scholarly opinion is divided over how much Jewish practice influenced 
church procedure apart from the Didascalia. See id. at 102-03. 
140. See Didascalia 2.47-56, supra note 138, at 142-59. 
141. See id. 2.49.1, at 142. 
142. See id. 2.49.2, at 142. 
143. See id. 2.51, at 148. 
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proper procedure.l44 No eyewitnesses had given evidence and the 
accused had not been present at the trial in question.14S The Pope 
is recorded to have said to the Emperor Constantius in person: 
"The ecclesiastical judgments must be given with careful justice 
. . .. [I]t is not tolerable to convict a man concerning whom we 
have not made any finding pursuant to proper procedure. "146 
Similarly, St. Augustine (354~430), the bishop of Hippo, empha~ 
sized that adequate procedure was indispensable to a just judg-
ment.147 Augustine taught that an ecclesiastical judge could not 
excommunicate persons on the basis of extrajudicial indications of 
their guilt, regardless of the extent to which such indications might 
be true (quamvis enim vera sint).l48 Proof had to be made before a 
judge pursuant to proper order: 
[N]ot rashly or in just any manner are evils to be lifted 
from the Church, but by judgment: so that if they cannot 
be lifted by judgment, they are rather to be tolerated .... 
For [the apostle Paul] did not wish man to be judged by 
man on the basis of suspicious opinion, or even by some 
judgment arrived at outside of procedure, but rather on 
the basis of God's law according to the procedure of the 
144. See Johannes Hernnann, Ein Streitgesprllch mit verfahrensrechtlichen 
Argumenten zwischen Kaiser Konstantius und Bischof Liberius. in Kleine Schriften zur 
Rechtsgeschichte 321. 321-30 (Gottfried Schiemann ed., 1990). 
145. See id. at 324. 
146. Id. Christianity was recognized in the Roman Empire in the first half of the fourth 
century. Soon thereafter bishops were invested with state-sanctioned authority to decide 
many disputes, including charges of clerical violations of criminal laws. See Stephen W. 
Findlay, Canonical Norms Governing the Deposition and Degradation of Clerics 9-10 
(Catholic University of America Canon Law Studies No. 130, 1941); Giulio VlStIlara, 
Episcopalis Audientia (Pubblicazioni della Universita Cattolica del Sacro CUore,2d Series: 
Scienze Giurdiche vol. 54, 1937). In 355, for example, an imperial constitution deprived 
magistrates of initial jurisdiction in trials of bishops and transferred it to the other bishops 
of the province. Georg May, Anklage- und zeugnisfllhigkeit oach der zweiten Sitzung des 
Konzils zu Karthago vom Jahre 419, 140 Theologische Quartalschrifl 163, 189-90 (1960). 
The close relationship of Roman law to the daily life of church members consciously or 
unconsciously exercised a deep influence on the formation of the legal order the Church 
applied to its proceedings. See id. at 186. For a summary of the interrelationship of 
ecclesiastical and imperial jurisdiction in the early Church, see Gaudemet, supra note 139, 
at 67-72; Charles P. Sherman, A Brief History of Imperial Roman Canon Law,7 Cal. L 
Rev. 93 (1918). 
147. See St. Augustine, Sermon 351 c.10 (De utili tate agendae poenitentiae [On the 
usefulness of doing penance]) (391), in 39 Patrologia Latina cols. 1533, 154547. 
148. "For however much certain things may be true [which community members know 
but cannot prove in court], they are nevertheless not easily to be believed by a judge, 
unless they are proven by sure evidence." ("Quamvis enim vera sint quaedam; non tamen 
judici facile credenda sunt, nisi certis indiciis demonstrentur.") Id. col. 1546. 
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Church with the person either having voluntarily con-
fessed or having been accused and convicted.149 
Without adherence to "judicial order and integrity" (ordine 
judiciario atque integritate),ls0 Augustine said, many innocent per-
sons would be convicted. 151 Augustine is the first writer known to 
have used the term "judicial order" (ordo iudiciarius ).152 The 
Council of Carthage (419) soon adopted his words almost verbatim 
as church law.1s3 These words continued to echo through the cen-
turies, reappearing continually in major ecclesiastical writings on 
procedure in the Middle Ages.1s4 
In the early seventh century, Pope Gregory I (the Great) (590-
604) translated the Church's longstanding insistence on procedural 
integrity into a statement of particulars.1ss Gregory's background 
prepared him for the task. Before entering clerical life, he had 
served as prefect of the City of Rome, a high secular post in which 
he was responsible for the city's civil administration and had juris-
diction over its citizens.1s6 As pope, Gregory received an appeal 
from a Spanish bishop, Stephen, in 603. Stephen complained that 
other bishops had ejected him unjustly from his episcopal see. In 
response to this complaint, Gregory assigned John the Defensor,ls7 
a trusted advisor/58 to go to Spain to investigate whether the pro-
ceeding against Stephen had been conducted properly. Gregory 
149.[NJon temere aut quomodolibet, sed per judicium auferendos esse malos ab 
Ecclesiae communione: ut si per judicium auferri non possunt, tolerentur potius 
. . . . Noluit enim hominem ab homine judicari ex arbitrio suspicionis, vel etiam 
extraordinario usurpato judicio. sed potius ex lege Dei secundum ordinem 
Ecclesiae, sive ultro confessum, sive accusatum atque convictum. 
Id. cols. 1546-47. 
150. Id. col. 1547. 
151. Id. 
152. See Fowler-Magerl, supra note 136, at 14. 
153. See May, supra note 146, at 185-86. 
154. See Fowler-Magerl, supra note 136, at 14. Most significantly, Gratian's twelfth· 
century compendium of canon law incorporates Augustine's sermon. See infra text 
accompanying note 236. For an instance of the sermon's appearance in secular law, see the 
Statutes of Venice (1242), 2d prologue, in Gli statuti veneziani di Jacopo TJepolo del 1242 e 
Ie loro glosse 9 (30 Memorie del Reale Istituto Veneto No.2, 1938). 
155. See Letter of instruction (commonitorium) from Pope Gregory to John the 
Defensor going into Spain (Aug. 603) [hereinafter Gregory, CommonitoriumJ, Register 
13.47, 13.49-50, in 2 Gregorii I papae Registrum epistolarum 410, 413·18 (paul Ewald & 
Ludwig M. Hartmann eds., MGH Epistolae No.2, Berlin, Weidmann 1899). 
156. 1 F. Homes Dudden, Gregory the Great 101·03 (1905). 
157. "Defensor" here was a representative of the Church in legal matters. See A. 
Gauthier, L'utilisation du droit romain dans la lettre de Gr6goire Ie Grand 11 Jean Ie 
DMenseur, 54 Angelicum 417, 419 (1977). 
158. See Jeffrey Richards, Consul of God 78 (1980). 
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provided John with a set of letters (commonitorium)lS9 to enable 
him to assess whether any impropriety had occurred at the trial. 
These instructions were based upon the legislation of Justinian, 
issued only a few decades earlier.160 They contained many refer-
ences to the Code, the Digest and the Novels.161 In his letters, 
Gregory carefully set out a list of points John was to investigate. 
Gregory's instructions constitute one of the earliest known legal 
summaries of an order of proceeding within Roman or ecclesiasti-
callaw:162 
Careful investigation must first be made to determine if 
the trial was held according to proper order, if some were 
accusers and others witnesses; then if the type of charges 
warranted deposition or exile, if the testimony was given 
under oath against [Stephen], with him present, if [the 
accusation] was made in writing and if he had opportunity 
to defend himself. Careful investigation must also be 
made of the character of the accusers and witnesses, of 
their type and reputation; whether they were unsuitable, 
lest perchance they had some hatreds against the said pas-
tor; whether they gave testimony from hearsay [utnlm tes-
timonium ex auditu dixerint] or testified that they knew 
certainly and exactly; and whether the judgment was 
given in writing and the sentence recited with the parties 
present. If by chance these things were not solemnly 
done and a charge not proved which was worthy of depo-
sition or exile, he [Stephen] should be recalled by all 
means to his church.163 
159. See 1 Max Conrat, Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des rllmischen Rechts im 
frUhen Mittelalter 8-9 (Scienta Verlag 1963) (1891). 
160. Hincmar, Archbishop of Reims (845-882), believed that "Gregory .•• composed 
the commonitoria [to John the Defensor] afresh from the imperial laws which he judged 
ecclesiastical." ("Gregorius ..• commonitoria ex integro de imperialibus contexuit legibus, 
quas ecclesiasticas judicavit.") Hincmar of Reims, De praedestinatione Dei et libero 
arbitrio c37 (859/60), in 125 Patrologia Latina cols. 65, 403. 
161. For a listing of the Justinianic laws Gregory employed in the commonilorillm, see 1 
Conrat, supra note 159, at 8 n.7. Gregory is the last Imown person to cite Justinian's Digest 
before its reappearance late in the eleventh century. See Cappelletti et a!., supra note 129, 
at 11. 
162. See Fowler-Magerl, supra note 136, at 9. 
163.[D]iligenter quaerendum est primo, si iudicium ordinabiliter est habitum aut si 
alii accusatores, alii testes fuerunt; deinde causarum qualitas, si digna exilio vel 
depositione fuit; aut si eo praesente sub iureiurando contra eum testimonium 
dictum est seu scriptis actum est vel ipse licentiam respondendi et defendendi se 
habuit. Sed et de personis accusantium ac testificantium suptiliter quaerendum 
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Gregory, clearly influenced by the Roman law, thus spelled out 
the basic elements of a fair trial. Implicit in Gregory's judicial 
order is a principle that judges should consider only testimony 
given by live witnesses under oath who have direct knowledge of 
the facts to which they testify. Reliance upon hearsay (testimonium 
ex auditu) ("testimony from hearing") violated that principle. 
Consequently, a judge's decision could not properly rest upon such 
testimony. By drawing up an order of procedure, Gregory did 
more than restrict factfinders' consideration of evidence. He also 
provided a powerful tool for appeal against judicial abuse. 
Gregory's commonitorium presumably applied to the cases of his 
day. It also had vast impact beyond his time. Together with 
Augustine's emphasis upon procedure, Gregory's definition of the 
fundamental elements of a fair trial became cornerstones of eccle-
siastical law.l64 Hincmar of Reims (845-882), who was deeply 
versed in both secular and canon law,165 would recall two and a half 
centuries later that "St. Augustine showed how there ought to be 
procedure in accusing and adjudicating .... Moreover, St. Greg-
ory ... commanded in his instruction to John the Defensor how 
judgment ought to be rendered according to judicial order and with 
integrity."166 Major ecclesiastical works of succeeding centuries 
repeated Gregory's instruction.167 
est, cuius condicionis cuiusve opinionis aut ne inopes sint aut ne forte aliquas 
contra praedictum episcopum inimicitias habuissent, et utrum testimonium ex 
auditu dixerunt aut certe specialiter se scire testati sunt vel si scriptis iudicatum 
est et partibus praesentibus sententia recitate est. Quod si forte haec sollemniter 
acta non sunt neque causa probata est, quae exilio vel depositione digna sit, in 
ecclesia sua modis omnibus revocetur. 
Gregory, Commonitorium, Register 13.47, supra note 155, at 411. 
164. For the importance of Gregory's commonitorium as a foundation of the later 
canonical procedural literature, see Fowler-Magerl, supra note 136, at 9-12. 
165. See J. Devisse. Hincmar et la loi 72-92 (Universite de Dakar, Faculte des Lettres et 
Sciences Humaines No.5, 1962). 
166. "Qualis ergo debeat esse ordo in accusatione et dijudicatione, sanctus Augustinus 
exponens ... , Qualiter autem sententia ordine iudicario et cum integritate proferenda sit 
... sanctus Gregorius ... in commonitorio Joanni Defensori eunti in Hispanias dato 
demonstrat." Hincmar of Reims, De presbyteris criminosis c.12 (frl6n7), in 125 Patrologia 
Latina col. 1098. Hincmar quotes extensively from both Augustine's Sermon 351 and 
Gregory's commonitorium. See id. 
167. See infra text accompanying notes 221, 237. 
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VII. THE LAWS OF THE VISIGOTHS AND THE STATEMENT OF 
THE MEDIEVAL HEARSAY RULE 
The Church was not alone in its effort to restrict testimony to 
that of live witnesses with firsthand knowledge. In the Visigothic 
kingdom of Spain,l68 just a few decades after Gregory's instruction 
to John, King Chindasvind (642-653), along with his son and suc-
cessor Reccesvind (649-672), began to reform the laws of the realm 
into an organized system that would apply to both Visigothic and 
Roman inhabitants.169 Roman law already had strong influence in 
the regionpo The work of the VlSigothic kings resulted in the 
Liber Iudiciorum (Book of Courts) or Fuero Juzgo (654).171 Like 
Justinian's Code, the Visigothic work contained a title "Concerning 
witnesses and written testimony."l72 It established a more precise 
restriction on witness testimony than any previously achieved by 
Roman or canonical legislation: "Witnesses shall not give their tes-
timony through letter, but while present they shall not be silent 
about the truth which they know, and they shall not speak about 
any other matters, except about those which they know to have 
been done in their presence. "173 
This law obviously resembles Justinian's legislation 174 in that 
both require the presence of witnesses before the court and both 
bar written testimony. But in contrast to Justinian's Code, which 
168. The realm of the Visigoths centered in Spain but also reached far into what today is 
southern France. See J.M. Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory 85 (1992). 
169. See Adolf Helfferich, Entstehung und G~hichte des Westgothen-Rcchts 87 
(Berlin, Georg Reimer 1858); P.D. King, Law and Society in the VlSigothic Kingdom 18 
(1972); E.N. van Kleffens, Hispanic Law Until the End of the Middle Ages 74-75 (1968). 
170. See Helfferich, supra note 169, at 132-34. In general. it was not the Roman law of 
Justinian that influenced Spain, but rather the pre-Justinian Code of Theodosius. See van 
Kleffens, supra note 169, at 40-41. 
171. A second edition of the Liber Judicionun appeared in 681 and a third in 693. See 
van Kleffens, supra note 169, at 75-76. The work is also referred to as the Libro de las 
Leyes or the Lex Barbara V"lSigodwnun. Id. at 74. 
172. Lex VlSigothorum 2.4 (654) [hereinafter Lex VIS.]. in Leges VlSigothorum 94-105 
(Karl Zeumer ed., MGH Leges Sectio I No.1, 1902). 
173. "Testes non per epistulam testimonium dicant, sed presentes quam noverunt non 
taceant veritatem nec de aliis nogotiis testimonium dicant, nisi de his tantummodo, que sub 
presentia eorum acta esse noscuntur." Lex Vis. 245 (643/44), supra note 172, at 98. The 
law is attributed to Chindasvind, see id., who issued most of his legislation in the second 
year of his reign. See Rafael de Urena y Smenjaud. La Legislaci6n g6tico-hispana 436 (2d 
ed. 1906). 
174. See Leges Visigothorum, supra note 172, at 98 & nn.1-2; Dig. 225.3.3-4, in 1 
Corpus luris Civilis, supra note 95, at 327-28; Code J. 4.20.16, in 2 Corpus Iuris Civilis, 
supra note 111, at 159. The remainder of Lex VlSigothorum 245 follows Nov. 90.5's 
provision for taking witness testimony outside of the court with original jurisdiction, see 
supra note 114, but without restricting it to civil cases. 
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somewhat ambiguously required that witnesses speak "about what 
they know,"175 Chindasvind expressly required witnesses to base 
their testimony upon what actually occurred in their presence; his 
formulation demands firsthand knowledge. Testimony based on 
secondhand knowledge-that is, hearsay-is precluded. Whereas 
Justinian rejected oral hearsay in a narrow context, Chindasvind 
set down a broad ban against derivative oral testimony. 
Chindasvind's precise law was destined to make a lasting impact 
beyond the bounds of Visigothic Spain.176 Continental jurispru-
dence began to adopt Chindasvind's hearsay bar for its judges a 
thousand years before England recognized a rule against hearsay in 
its jury courtS.177 Ironically, it was a curious but singularly impor-
tant episode in medieval forgery that helped the Visigothic formu-
lation spread across the Continent. 
VIII. THE FORGERIES OF THE PSEUDOISIDOREANS178 
In the mid-ninth century, a group of unknown clerics working in 
France, probably at Reims,179 undertook to protect bishops and 
higher clerics against the accusations of lower clergy and secular 
authorities.180 The clerics wanted to make it virtually impossible to 
try or even accuse a bishop.181 To strengthen their hand in this 
struggle for episcopal independence, they decided to create legal 
authority for their position. The clerics, therefore, resorted to the 
use of a common medieval tool: forgery. Plagiarizing thousands of 
sentences and phrases from many genuine secular and canonical 
laws, the forgers inserted their own interpolations as they arranged 
175. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
176. For an account of the influence of the Liber ludiciorum (Fuero Juzgo) within Spain 
and in its later colonies, see van Kleffens, supra note 169. at 79, 255-82. 
177. The rule against hearsay was not firmly established in England until at least the late 
seventeenth century. See 5 Wigmore, supra note 9, § 1364, at 18. "No precise date or 
ruling stands out as decisive: but it seems to be between 1675 and 1690 that the fixing of 
the doctrine takes place." Id. 
178. For studies of the pseudoisidorean forgeries, see E.H. Davenport, The False 
Decretals (1916); 1 Paul Fournier & Gabriel Le Bras, Histoire des collections canoniques 
en Occident depuis les Fausses D~cr~tales jusqu'au D~cret Gratien 127-201 (1931); Emil 
Seckel, Pseudoisidor, in 16 Realencykloplidie fUr protestantische Theologie und Kirche 265 
(Albert Hauck ed., 3d ed. 1905). 
179. See James A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law 26-27 (1995); Seckel, supra note 178, 
at 300. 
180. Seckel, supra note 178, at 280, 301. 
181. Id.; see also Fowler-Magerl, supra note 136, at 13-14. 
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their bits and pieces into a mosaic suiting their purposes. l82 They 
then issued their products under the names of past emperors and 
popes.183 
The False Capitularies 
These clever, industrious people entitled their first work The 
Collection of the Capitularies of Benedict Levitas (847).184 It pur-
ported to be a collection by one Benedict Levitas of hundreds of 
Frankish laws issued by Charlemagne (777-814) and Louis the 
Pious (814-840).185 These forgeries, now known as the False Capit-
ularies,186 were soon accepted as genuine.l87 
The law of Chindasvind against hearsay was among the sources 
the forgers covertly employed.188 In the False Capitularies, the 
forgers twice reproduced the bar against hearsay, attributing it to 
the Frankish kings rather than to the Visigothic law.l89 The first of 
these capitularies states: 
[Rubric:)190 That witnesses may testify only to those mat-
ters they know were done in their own sight. [Tex1:] \Vit-
nesses not absent and not by letter shall give their 
testimony, but they shall not be silent about the truth they 
know and saw, and they shall not give testimony about 
182. The forgers' technique has often been described as a "mosaic" style of composition. 
See, e.g., 1 Fournier & Le Bras, supra note 178. at 179; Seckel. supra note 178. at m.. 
183. See Davenport, supra note 178, at xxi, 100-01; Seckel. supra note 178. at 272. 
184. For the text, see Benedicti Capitularia (F.H. Knust ed.), in 2 MGH Leges pt. 2 at 17 
(Hannover, Hahn 1837). A "capitulary" was a Frankish term for a royal legislative or 
administrative order divided into capitula. See Fran~is Louis Ganshof, Recherches sur les 
capitulaires 3-6 (1958). 
185. See Benedicti Capitularia, supra note 184. at 39; 1 Fournier & Le Bras, supra note 
178, at 146-47; Seckel, supra note 178, at 296-97, 302. 
186. 1 Fournier & Le Bras, supra note 178, at 146. 
187. See 1 Heinrich Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte 387 (Leipzig, Duncker & 
Humblot 1887). 
188. See F.H. Knust, Preface to Benedicti Capitularia, supra note 184, at 23-24. Knust 
gives a list of the sources for each capitUlary. Id. at 19-31. The sources and interpolations 
are carefully examined in Emil Seckel, Studien zu Benedictus Levita (pts. 1-8),26 Neues 
Archiv der Gesellschaft fUr altere deutsche Geschichtskunde 37 (Hahn'sche Buchhandlung 
1985) (1901) [hereinafter Neues Archiv], 29 Neues Archiv 275 (1904),31 Neues Archiv 59 
(1906),34 Neues Archiv 319 (1909),35 Neues Archiv 105,433 (1910),39 Neues Archiv 327 
(1914),40 Neues Archiv 15 (1915),41 Neues Archiv 157 (1919). 
189. See Benedictus Levita 2.147, 2.345 (847/52) [hereinafter Ben. Lev.], in Benedicti 
Capitularia, supra note 184, at 80, 90. 
190. Each capitulary is prefaced by a rubric summarizing its content. See Seckel, supra 
note 178, at 297. The rubrics were sometimes part of the original plagiarized text or, at 
other times, were the forgers' own making. Id. The rubric here is the forgers' O\',n 
composition. See Seckel, supra note 188, 34 Neues Archiv at 373. 
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other matters, except about those alone which they know 
to have been done in their presence.191 
Although basically a quotation of Chindasvind's hearsay law, 
this passage contains slight but significant alterations that would 
later raise the question of whether any testimony based on hearing 
(ex aUditu) could serve as the basis for a judgment.l92 The forgers 
phrased their rubric pointedly: witnesses could only testify to what 
was done "in their own sight,"193 so that the reader could not possi-
bly miss the point that testimony had to be based on seeing. Simi-
larly, the forgers added their own significant addition to the 
Visigothic requirement that witnesses testify only about "what they 
know."194 They inserted their interpolation "and saw,"195 making 
the same point contained in the rubric: knowledge must be based 
on sight. 
In a second capitulary of Benedict Levitas,196 again ascribed to 
the Frankish kings, the forgers repeated their variation of Chindas-
vind's hearsay rule, but now they added an observation taken from 
a sermon of St. Augustine to support the point that only eyewitness 
testimony was acceptable: when the Pharisees learned of reports 
that Jesus' body was missing from the tomb and that some of his 
followers claimed that he was alive, the Pharisees went to the 
soldiers who had guarded the grave. "The pharisees say to the 
soldiers, 'We give you money and you say that, while you were 
asleep, the disciples of Jesus came and stole him away.' Of this 
Augustine says: . . .. 'If they were sleeping, how could they see? 
And if they saw nothing, how could they be witnesses?' "197 Any-
thing short of eyewitness testimony thus appeared to be barred. 
This rigid stance, in keeping with the pseudoisidoreans' overall 
purpose to impede trials against bishops, went far beyond the Visi-
191. "[Rubric:] Ut testes ea tan tum testijicentur, quae in conspectu eorum acta esse 
noscuntur. [Text:] Testes non absentes neque per epistulam testimonium dicant: sed 
praesentes quam noverunt et viderunt non taceant veritatem. Nec de aliis testimonium 
dicant, nisi de his tantummodo, quae sub praesentia eorum acta esse noscuntur." Ben. 
Lev. 2.147. in Benedicti Capitularia, supra note 184, at 80. 
192. See infra text accompanying note 248. 
193. The Latin phrase reads "in conspectu eorum." See Ben. Lev. 2.147, in Benedicti 
Capitularia, supra note 184, at 80. 
194. The Latin is "quam noverunt." Lex Vis. 2.4.5, supra note 172, at 98. 
195. In Latin, "et viderunt." See supra note 191. The phrase is of the forgers' own 
making. See Seckel, supra note 188, 34 Neues Archiv at 373. 
196. Ben. Lev. 2.345, in Benedicti Capitularia, supra note 184, at 90. 
197. "Damus, inquiunt pharisaei ad milites, vobis pecuniam, et dicite quia vobis 
dormientibus venerunt discipuli Iesu et abstulerunt eum. Unde ait Augustinus: . . .. Si 
dormiebant, quid videre potuerunt? Si nihil viderunt, quomodo testes sunt?" Id. 
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gothic law's requirement of personal knowledge as a basis of testi-
mony. Taken literally, such a rule would bar consideration of 
everything whatsoever that anyone heard. In any event, injecting a 
requirement that testimony be based upon "seeing" to be a basis of 
proof inevitably would cause problems as the pseudoisidorean 
interpolation spread into authentic canonical collections.19s Later 
jurists wrestled, for example, about whether oral statements of any 
kind based on hearing could be used as evidence. 
The False Decretals 
Not satisfied, perhaps, that they would accomplish their goals 
merely by attributing legal principles to the secular laws of the 
Frankish kings, the forgers, working out of the same workshop,199 
soon undertook a further and much greater project of falsification. 
They issued a gigantic set of documents or decretals,2oo allegedly 
the authoritative letters of earlier popes. Like the False Capitu-
laries, these documents were long accepted as genuine.2DI They 
were thought to have been collected by one Isidore Mercator.202 
Known as the False Decretals,2D3 they were probably produced in 
850, just a few years after the False Capitularies.W4 
Again the forgers twice reproduced the rule against hearsay 
which they had borrowed from the Visigothic law. FIrSt, they 
included it in a letter supposedly of Pope Calixtus (217-222) to the 
bishops of Gaul: "Similarly witnesses shall not proffer testimony 
through any writing, but present they shall truly give testimony 
about what they knew and saw. And they shall not give testimony 
about other issues or matters, except about those they know to 
198. See infra note 248 and accompanying text. 
199. See Davenport, supra note 178, at xxi, 100·03; Seckel, supra note 178, at 302. 3~-
05. 
200. "Decretal" is a written papal response to an ecclesiastical judge's request for advice 
on a point of law, or a written papal announcement of the applicable law in the context of 
an individual case. See C. Duggan, Decretals (episto/ae decretales, lilterae deere/ales), in 4 
New Catholic Encyclopedia 707, J07 (Catholic University of America ed., 1967). 
201. See Davenport, supra note 178, at xxiii. 
202. See Seckel, supra note 178, at 284. 
203. The standard modem edition of the False Decretals is Decretales Pseudo-
Isidorianae et Capitula Angilramni (paul Hinschius ed., Leipzig, Bernhard Tauchnitz 1853) 
[hereinafter Decretales]. 
204. See Davenport, supra note 178, at xxi-xxii. The False DecretaIs were not 
definitively determined to be a forgery until 1628. Id. at xxiii n.7; Seckel, supra note 178, at 
293. 
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have been done in their presence."20S Next, the forgers included 
the Visigothic exclusion of derivative evidence in a letter Pope 
Damasus (366-384) allegedly sent to the bishops of Italy: "Whence 
the canonical constitutions of our fathers, not once but very often, 
demand that it is not possible to proffer either accusations or testi-
monies through writings nor can anyone give testimony about 
other matters except about those which they know to have been 
done in their presence. "206 
The pseudoisidoreans had effectively cloaked Chindasvind's 
hearsay rule with Frankish and papal authority. The rule could 
now pass beyond the borders of the Visigothic kingdom and claim 
the obedience of judges across Christian Europe. 
IX. ENTRANCE OF THE RULE INTO AUTHENTIC COLLECTIONS 
OF LAW 
Over the course of the next three centuries, individual bishops 
made collections of norms (canonsY07 governing the Church's pro-
cedural and substantive law. They drew these canons from exisit-
ing authorities, including the pronouncements of ecclesiastical 
councils and papal decretals.208 Many of the passages of the False 
Decretals, including the restriction of witnesses to firsthand knowl-
edge, were restated within these canonical collections.209 
In the German region, Burchard (965-1025), the bishop of 
Worms, issued his Decretum (1008112), which became a standard 
reference work in medievallibraries.210 Burchard reproduced the 
205. "Similiter testes per quamcumque scripturam testimonium non proferant, sed 
praesentes quam viderunt et noverunt testimonium dicant. Nec de aliis causis vel negotiis 
testimonium dicant, nisi de his que sub praesentia eorum acta esse noscuntur." Ps.-
Calixtus I c.17, in Decretales, supra note 203, at 137. 141. The abbreviation "Ps." for 
"Pseudo," when prefixed to a papal name, indicates the letter was composed by the 
pseudoisidorean forgers and not by the pope to whom they attributed it. 
206. "Unde canonica patrum constituta non semel, sed saepissime clamant nec 
accusationes nec testimonia ulla per scripta posse proferre, nec de aliis negotiis quicumque 
testimonium dicant. nisi de his quae sub praesentia eorum esse noscuntur." Letter of Ps.-
Damasus to the Italian Bishops, in Decretales, supra note 203, at 519-20. 
207. The word "canon" can refer to any ecclesiastical statute or regulation. See 
Sherman, supra note 146, at 97. In the context of medieval ecclesiastical law, the term was 
more narrowly used to designate the statutes of a bishop, a chapter or the rules of a 
religious order. Id. 
208. See van de Wiel, supra note 139, at 68. 
209. For an exhaustive analysis of the absorption of the pseudoisidorean forgeries into 
later canonical collections, see Horst Fuhrmann, Einfiuss und Verbreitung der 
pseudoisidorischen Flilschungen (MGH Schriften No. 24, 3 vols. 1972-1974). 
210. See Brundage, supra note 179, at 32. 
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hearsay rule, ascribing it (he thought accurately) to Pope CaliA-rus, 
just as the forgers had hoped.211 
In Italy, the Collection in Seventy-Four Titles,212 one of the most 
widely used canonical collections through the mid-twelfth cen-
tury,213 repeated the rule.214 Anselm of Lucca (1036-1086), also in 
Italy, produced his broadly popular Collectio canonum, whose 
influence extended beyond Italy.21S He set out the hearsay rule as 
he believed he had received it from Pope CalixtuS.216 In 1087 Car-
dinal Deusdedit of Rome produced still another collection and 
included the hearsay rule, attributing it first to Pope CaliA-rug217 and 
later to Pope Siricius (384-389).218 Of particular importance, Ivo of 
Chartres (1040-1115), writing in the French region between 1093 
and 1095, produced his Decretum and the shorter Panormia. In 
these collections, Ivo related the rule against hearsay as he 
believed Ca1ixtus had declared it in his letter to the bishops of 
Gaul.219 Ivo also included Justinian's constitution with its state-
ment against oral hearsay as set out in Julian's Epitome:220 In both 
211. See Burchard of Wonns, Decretum, in 140 Patrologia Latina col. 537, c.U71. at 
col. 599. Burchard's version of Ps.-Calixtus's letter does not include the rorgers' 
interpolation about seeing. Id. 
212. See Collection in Seventy-Four TItles (Diversorum patrum senten tie) (105on6), in 
Diversorum patrum sententie siue Collectio in LXXIV titulos digesta 1 (John T. Gilchrist 
ed., MIC Series B: Corpus Collectionum vol. I, 1973). 
213. See John T. Gilchrist, Prolegomena to Diversorum patrum sententie siue Collectio 
in LXXIV titulos digesta. supra note 212, at xvii, xxvii. The author is unknown. Id. at lOOC: 
Brundage, supra note 179, at 37. 
214. See Collection in Seventy-Four TItles c.48, supra note 212, at 46. 
215. See John T. Gilchrist, Anselm of Lucca. St, in 1 New Catholic Encyclopedia, supra 
note 200, at 584-85. 
216. See Anselm of Lucca, Collectio canonum 3.53 (1081186), in 1 Anselmi episcopi 
Lucensis, Collectio canonum una cum collectione minore 142 (Friedrich Thaner ed., 1906). 
Anselm's version of the letter includes the requirement that the witness saw that to which 
he or she testified. Id. Anselm also included Gregory's commonitorilun, see supra note 
155, with its ban on hearsay. See id. 3.90, at 169. 
217. See Deusdedit, Liber canonum 4319, in 1 Die Kanonessammlung des Kardinals 
Deusdedit, at 1, 562-63 (Victor Wolf von Glanvell ed., 1905). 
218. Id. 4333, at 568-69. These versions of the pseudopapal decretals repeat the 
VlSigothic hearsay ban but do not include a requirement that testimony be based upon 
seeing only. Id. Deusdedit also included Gregory's admonition against hearsay. Id. 3.96, 
at 309. 
219. See Ivo of Chartres, Decretum 5.289 (c. 1094), in 161 Patrologia Latina cols. 59, 411 
[hereinafter Decretum of Ivo] (sight requirement); Ivo of Chartres, Panormia 4.93 (10941 
96), in 161 Patrologia Latina cols. 1045, 1201 [hereinafter Panormia] (no sight 
requirement). 
220. See Decretum of Ivo 16.152, supra note 219, col. 934. Ivo is largely responsible for 
.spreading knowledge of Roman law north of the Alps. See van de \viel, supra note 139, at 
97. 
HeinOnline -- 36 Va. J. Int’l L. 34 1995-1996
34 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 36:1 
the Decretum and the Panormia, Ivo repeated Pope Gregory's 
instruction, summarizing the elements of proper procedure and cit-
ing hearsay as a violation.221 In the Panormia, Gregory's rejection 
is placed after the one attributed to Calixtus.222 Ivo also included 
in both his works Augustine's passages requiring the observance of 
integral order in arriving at judgments.223 
These rules were not merely academic. Their combined effect 
on practice is evident in an undated letter of Ivo to Lisiardus, the 
bishop of Sens.224 Ivo responded to an inquiry about an accusation 
that a certain woman had had illicit relations with a close relative 
of her present husband. To prove the deed, the woman's accuser 
wished to use witnesses who had not seen the illicit act take place. 
Ivo advised that no one was to be judged a criminal unless con-
victed according to judicial order. Regarding the proferred wit-
nesses, he declared: "[The witnesses] who did not see the deed, 
however much they may be speaking truths, must nevertheless not 
be heard, since the secular laws [leges] demand that witnesses must 
not be admitted [non esse admittendos] against an accused, except 
about those matters which they know to have been done in their 
presence. "225 
In his response, Ivo adopted Augustine'S position that judgments 
are not acceptable unless they are reached through proper order226 
and melded it with the Visigothic hearsay rejection, received 
through the pseudoisidorean forgers. Ivo recognized that what wit-
nesses learned apart from their direct knowledge could well be 
true. Yet, "however much they may be speaking truths," he 
declared, the derivative testimony could not play a role in the 
factfinder's decision making because it violated the demand that 
judgments be based only on the testimony of witnesses with first-
hand knowledge. Ivo's directions were given to a bishop sitting as 
judge, not to be thought a naive factfinder. 
221. See Decretum of Ivo 6.343, supra note 219, col. 515; Panormia 4.82, supra note 219, 
col. 1200; id. 4.94. col. 1202. 
222. See Panormia 4.93-94, supra note 219, cols. 1201-02. 
223. See Decretum of Ivo 5.244. supra note 219, cols. 397-98; id. 5.247, col. 399; 
Panormia 4.113, supra note 219, col. 1206. 
224. See Ivo of Chartres, Epistola 229, in 162 Patrologia Latina col. 232. 
225. "[Testes] qui factum non viderunt, quamvis vera dicant, non sunt tamen audiendi, 
cum leges contineant testes adversus reum non esse admittendos, nisi de his quae sub 
praesentia eorum facta esse noscuntur." Id. 
226. See supra text accompanying notes 150-52. 
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X. GRATIAN'S DECRETUM 
In the mid-twelfth century, Gratian, a canon law scholar about 
whom almost nothing is known,227 surveyed the vast number of 
canons existing in his day. Recognizing that some canons were 
incompatible with others, Gratian sought to bring order to this 
mass of material. About 1140, at Bologna, he produced his Con-
cordance of Discordant Canons, later known as the Decretum of 
Gratian.228 This enormous text, borrowing heavily from earlier 
canonical collections, transcended them all in thoroughness.229 It 
constituted "the first comprehensive and systematic legal treatise 
in the history of the West. "230 
Gratian organized a major section of his work around a series of 
hypothetical cases (causae).231 He asked questions and then 
answered them by using selected canons drawn from earlier canon-
ical collections, harmonizing discordant canons when possible. 
Gratian often prefaced his canons with short statements of his own 
(rubrics) which set out his view of a canon's salient point.232 Some-
times he added his own statements (dicta) before and after the 
canon to explain it.233 
In his second hypothetical, Gratian posed the case of a bishop 
accused of a violation of chastity.234 In reviewing the adequacy of 
the proceedings against the bishop, Gratian amassed authorities 
which stressed the fundamental importance of proper procedure.235 
127. See Brundage, supra note 179, at 47; Knut W. NOrr, Die Entwicklung des Corpus 
iuris canonici, in 1 Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europ!1ischen 
Privatrechtsgeschichte 835, 836 (Helmut Coing ed., 1973) [hereinafter 1 Handbuch]. 
128. For the text, see Gratian, Decretum Magistri Gratiani, in 1-2 Corpus Iuris Canonici 
(Emil Friedberg ed., Leipzig, Bernhard Tauchnitz 1879) [hereinafter CIC). 
129. Earlier canonical collections fell out of use after the Decrerum's appearance, and 
canons not adopted by Gratian generally lost their force and were forgonen. See NOrr, 
supra note 127, at 838. 
230. Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of Western Legal Tradition 
143 (1983). For a short account of Gratian's method of composition, see id. at 143-48. For 
a comprehensive analysis, see Johann F. von Schulle, 1 Die Geschichte der Quellen und 
Literatur des Canonischen Rechts 46-75 (Akademische Druck-V. Verlaganstadt 1956) 
(1875). 
231. See Decreti Secunda Pars, in 1 CIC, supra note 128, col. 356. 
232. See von Schulte, supra note 230, at 53, 61. 
233. rd. at 55. 
234. See C.2.pr., in 1 CIC, supra note 128, col. 438. 
235. For a thorough description and analysis of proper trial procedure under the 
Decretum, see Envin Jacobi, Der Prozess im Decretum Gratiani und bci den mtesten 
Dekretisten, 34 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fUr Rechtsgeschichte, Kanonistiche 
Abteilung 3, at 223 (1913). For discussion of Gratian's regulations on the use of witnesses. 
see id. at 300-13; Filippo Liotta, n testimone nel Decreto di Graziano, in Proceedings of 
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After citing Augustine's insistence on the faithful observance of 
judicial order,236 Gratian quoted Pope Gregory's instruction that 
judicial order requires primary testimony and does not tolerate 
hearsay.237 
Gratian's third hypothetical again raised the issue of hearsay.238 
He presented the case of a bishop who sought reinstatement to his 
see after having been deposed for unspecified reasons. At the 
bishop's trial, some persons absent from the courtroom tried to 
submit testimony against him by letter. To support his rejection of 
this procedure, Gratian repeated Chindasvind's Visigothic hearsay 
bar, together with the pseudoisidorean interpolation requiring tes-
timony to be based on seeing. Gratian ascribed his canon to Pope 
Calixtus, just as the pseudoisidoreans would have wanted: 
Witnesses are not to proffer testimony through any writ-
ing, but, while present, they are to give testimony truly 
about those things which they saw and knew. Nor are 
they to give testimony about any other cases or matters, 
except those which they know to have been done in their 
presence.239 
Thus, the greatest compendium of the Church's law directed judges 
to consider only testimony given in court and based on firsthand 
knowledge.240 
the Fourth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law 81 (Stephan Kuttner ed., MIC 
Series C: Subsidia vol. 5, 1976). For analysis of the role of the medieval judge in decision-
making, see Richard M. Fraher, Conviction According to Conscience: The Medieval 
Jurists' Debate Concerning Judicial Discretion and the Law of Proof, 7 Law & Hist. Rev. 
23, 34 (1989); Knut Wolfgang N()rr, Zur Stellung des Richters im gelehrten Prozess der 
FrUhzeit: Iudex secundum allegata non secundum conscientiam iudicat (C.H. Beck'sche. 
Munich 1967). 
236. C.2 q.1 c.1, in 1 CIC, supra note 228, col. 438. 
237. C.2 q.1 c.7, in 1 CIC, supra note 228, cols. 439-42. 
238. See C.3.pr., in 1 CIC, supra note 228, col. 504. 
239. "Testes per quamcumque scripturam testimonium non proferant, sed presentes de 
his, que uiderunt et noverunt, veraciter testimonium dicant. nec de aliis causis uel negotiis 
testimonium dicant, nisi de his, que sub eorum presentia acta esse noscuntur." C.3 q.9 c.15. 
in 1 CIC, supra note 228, col. 532. Compare Lex Vis. 2.4.5, supra note 172, at 98. 
240. "In a formal legal sense, Gratian's Decretum never acquired the force of law, but 
its effect would have been essentially no different if it had been proclaimed in a legislative 
act, especially because it was frequently regarded as a certified ecclesiastical codification 
analogous to the Roman Corpus Iuris Civilis." 2 Fuhrmann, supra note 209, at 564 (1973). 
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XI. TWELFTH- AND THIRTEENTH-CENTURY REFINEMENT OF 
THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY 
Beginning in the late eleventh century, Bologna had become the 
principal European center for learning both Roman and canon 
law.241 A rediscovery of the full text of the Digest at about this 
time provided a great impetus to Roman law studies.242 Canonists 
engaged in a parallel effort to explicate Gratian's Decretllm.243 By 
the mid-twelfth century, thousands of students from all over 
Europe, including England, travelled to the univeristy at Bologna 
to hear lectures, to study and to absorb the teaching of the doctors 
of Roman and ecclesiastical law.244 Students studied both bodies 
of law.245 The teachings of the university jurists came to have 
immense impact throughout Western Europe as the students 
returned to practice in their own countries as lawyers, judges and 
administrators.246 Both the canonists and the Roman law scholars 
embraced and carefully refined the doctrine that derivative testi-
mony was to have no place in a factfinder's considerations. 
The first medieval jurists to grapple with derivative testimony 
did not possess an adequate term to capture the kind of testimony 
that would violate Gratian's rule. They loosely employed the 
phrase testimonium ex auditu (testimony from hearing) to desig-
nate witness statements the factfinding judge should not consider. 
241. See Cappelletti et aI., supra note 129, at 13-18; Charles Donahue, Jr., Proof by 
Witnesses in the Church Courts of Medieval England: An Imperfect Reception of the 
Learned Law, in On the Laws and Customs of England: Essays in Honor of Samuel E. 
Thorne 127, 129 (Morris S. Arnold et al. eds., 1981). 
242. See Kunkel, supra note 11, at 182. 
243. See Knut W. Nilrr, Die Kanonistische Literatur, in 1 Handbuch, supra note m. at 
365, 365-66. 
244. See Cappelletti et aI., supra note 129, at 13-26 (describing the revival of Roman and 
canon law studies, beginning at Bologna). 
245. See Helmut Coing, Die juristische Fakultl1t und ihr Lehrprogramm, in 1 Handbuch, 
supra note 227, at 39, 70. "The most immediately practical result of the revival of academic 
law study at Bologna in the twelfth century was the joint development by both civilians and 
canonists. generally using sources from both laws, of what has come to be kno\\n as the 
Romano-canonic procedural system." Donahue, supra note 241, at 127-28. 
246. Revived Roman law and canon law "fused into a single normative s)'Stem," 
Cappelletti et aI., supra note 129, at 16, called the jlls conunlme, which gradually was 
applied, especially in the area of procedural law, across the European continent. See 
Kelly, supra note 168, at 180. Spread by the university·trained civil and canon lawyers. and 
received in different countries at different rates, the jllS conunlme came to replace older 
Germanic customary laws. Id. Thus, the "irrational" Germanic procedures of trial by 
ordeal, battle and compurgation began to be supplanted by the rational procedures of the 
Romano-canonical system. See Donahue, supra note 241, at 128-29. 
For a study of the employment positions which medieval law students filled after 
graduation, see Coing, supra note 245, at 85·90. 
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This was the same term Gregory the Great had used some 600 
years earlier in his instruction to John the Defensor.247 On its face, 
however, ex auditu could apply to far more than derivative testi-
mony. Taken literally, the words encompassed all testimony based 
upon the sense of hearing. Yet a trial system that depended upon a 
witness's observations but excluded anything that a witness heard 
would be impractical. The problem presented a challenge to the 
analytic ability of jurists to distinguish the "hearing" testimony that 
a factfinding judge could properly consider from the mass of testi-
mony that violated Gratian's rule. The solution, achieved over the 
course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, represents one of the 
great accomplishments of evidentiary law. 
The difficulty of determining what "hearing" testimony, if any, 
could serve as the basis for a judgment was apparent in the 
Decretum itself. Gratian's canon insisted upon sight as the basis of 
witness testimony. This rigid requirement, it will be recalled, is 
traceable to the pseudoisidorean forgers' editorial addition to the 
original Visigothic hearsay law.248 Yet the Decretum acknowledges 
that Justinian himself had allowed solemnly attesting witnesses to 
say that they heard a creditor confess payment of a debt, even 
though Justinian rejected casually overheard statements.249 In 
dicta after Gratian's hearsay canon, Justinian's discordant passage 
was appended.250 In an attempt to harmonize the two, the dictum 
simply declared that Justinian permitted an exception in civil cases 
to the usual rule that all testimony be based on sight.251 This reso-
lution, of course, was inadequate because all other testimony 
remained subject to the sight requirement. 
Canon law scholars after Gratian made repeated attempts to 
articulate how the hearsay canon, with a sight requirement embed-
ded in it, could be properly understood. Realizing that the purpose 
of Gratian's rule was to guarantee testimony based on firsthand 
knowledge, they were unwilling to adopt an interpretation that 
247. See supra note 163. 
248. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
249. See supra note 126. 
250. Portions of the Roman law, particularly those taken from the Digest and the Code, 
may have been inserted into the Decretum after Gratian composed it. See Adam Vetulani, 
Gratien et Ie droit romain, 24-25 Revue historique de droit fran~ais et etranger 47 (4th ser. 
1946-1947); see also Jean Gaudemet, Das r~mische Recht in Gratians Dekret, 12 
Csterreichisches Archiv fUr Kirchenrecht 177 (1961) (maintaining that Roman law 
passages in the Decretum were added continually and slowly during the latter twelfth 
century). 
251. See C.3 q.9 c.15 Cd.p.), in 1 CIC, supra note 228, cols. 532-33. 
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excluded large amounts of primary testimony. An unknown 
author, commenting on a summary of the Decretum, made an 
attempt to relax the sight requirement by expanding Justinian's 
hearing exception.252 The author maintained that the sight require-
ment did not apply to any "contracts of which the substance con-
sists only of words, as in a stipulation."253 This exception, though 
broader than Gratian's, still left almost all hearing-based testimony 
subject to Gratian's bar. No trial system could survive the exclu-
sion of so much primary testimony. 
Around 1158, Rufinus, a teacher of canon law at Bologna who 
may have studied under Gratian,2S4 produced his own summary of 
Gratian and made an attempt to articulate what hearing evidence 
could be used.255 Commenting upon Gratian's exception, Rufinus 
remarked: "Here [Gratian] gives one case [attesting to a debt] in 
which someone can be a witness on the basis of hearing [de audim] 
.... "256 Rufinus pointed out that Gratian himself made a further 
exception to the sight requirement in another section of the 
Decretum, where he allowed proof from hearing that persons were 
blood relatives (which, it would appear, could not be proven by 
eyewitnesses).257 Rufinus also noted that the Bible allowed hear-
ing-based testimony in still another case, where such evidence was 
used to prove that someone had been heard blaspheming God. In 
this case there could not be any witnesses except those basing their 
testimony on hearing the blasphemies.258 These exceptions edged 
beyond the narrow limits of Gratian, but Rufinus's true contribu-
tion to understanding the problem of hearing testimony came not 
252. See Incerti auctoris quaestiones. in Die Summa Magistri Rolandi 237 (Friedrich 
Thaner ed., Innsbruck, Wagner'sche Universitlit, 1874). Magister Rolandus composed his 
summary of Gratian by 1148. The notes of the unknown author were made between 1154 
and 1179. See Friedrich Thaner, Introduction to Die Summa Magistri Rolandi, supra, ix, 
Iii. 
253. "In his autem contractibus, quorum substantia ex solis verbis subsistit, ut in 
stipulatione, etiam illi ... ex auditu possunt ferre testimonium." ("Moreover in those 
contracts, whose substance consists only in words. they [Witnesses] ... can relate testimony 
from hearing." Incerti auctoris quaestiones, supra note 252, at 278. 
254. See Smith, supra note 133, at 24. 
255. See Rufinus, Summa on C3 q.9 (1157/59). in Die Summa Decretorum des Magister 
Rufinus 270-71 (Heinrich Singer ed., 1902) [hereinafter Rufinus]. 
256. "Hic porut casum unum, in quo quis de auditu potest esse testis .... " Id. at 270. 
257. See id. 
258. "Videtur tamen et alibi posse esse testis de auditu. sicut in verteri testamento de eo, 
qui audiebat aliquem blasphemantem Deum: in quo casu non potcrant esse testes nisi de 
audita blasphemia." ("It seems nevertheless that there otherwise can be a \\;tness from 
hearing, as in the old testament concerning a person who heard someone blaspheming 
God: in which case there could be no witnesses except from hearing the blasphemies.") Id. 
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in adding one exception after another. Rather, he broke new 
ground by showing that a vast amount of hearing testimony was 
perfectly acceptable and only one species so dangerous that it 
could not play any role in forming a judgment: 
But it must be noted that it is said in two ways that some-
one can be a witness about that which he heard. Either 
that he gives testimony about a matter, which when it was 
happening, he heard; or that he gives testimony about a 
matter which he heard had been or was being narrated by 
another.259 
As examples of the first type, Rufinus listed a witness who heard 
his neighbor promise to marry, or a witness who heard someone 
blaspheming God, reviling his bishop or swearing by the name of 
Caesar.260 Rufinus declared that in these cases testimony based on 
hearing should be permitted.261 Furthermore, said Rufinus, "in 
numberless other similar cases," such hearing testimony was 
acceptable when "there cannot be a witness except about that 
which he heard."262 In Rufinus's view, only the second type of 
hearing testimony was improper for a judge to consider. As an 
example, Rufinus cited Justinian's bar against witnesses who, 
merely in passing by, heard someone talking about a debt.263 This 
second kind of testimony based on what was reported by another 
"is properly said to be testimony from hearing [de aUditu] and 
therefore is not receivable [non est receptabile] .... "264 
Rufinus finally faced squarely the sight-based restriction 
implanted in Gratian's hearsay rule and proceeded to dismantle it. 
He began with some difficulty: "[T]he first [type of] testimony [ver-
bal acts], however, is not called testimony from hearing except 
inappropriately, but properly it is testimony from seeing, i.e., about 
that which was perceived fully, when it happened, by seeing, i.e., by 
259. "Sed notandum est quod duobus modis dicitur aliquis esse testis de eo, quod 
audivit. Vel quia fert testimonium de re, quam, cum fiebat. audivit; vel quia perhibet 
testimonium de re, quam fuisse vel esse ab alio narrari audivit." Id. 
260. Id. 
261. Id. Modern lawyers would refer to such matters as "verbal acts." See, e.g., 
McCormick on Evidence 733-34 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984). 
262. "[I]n ... aliis infinitis negotiis similibus non posset esse testis nisi de eo, quod 
audivit." Rufinus, supra note 255, at 270. 
263. See supra text accompanying notes 125-27. 
264. "Secundum testimonium proprie dicitur testimonium de auditu et ideo non est 
receptabile .... " Rufinus, supra note 255, at 270. Rufinus cites exceptions for proof of 
consanguinity and solemn attestation concerning debt. Id. 
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hearing. "265 Rufinus quickly clarified his point by interpreting 
"seeing" as a metaphor for perception by all corporeal senses. 
"For sight is accepted for every bodily sense .... "266 To justify his 
expansive view of seeing, Rufinus quoted a sermon of Augustine, 
another of whose homilies the pseudoisidorean forgers had origi-
nally cited to justify the sight requirement:267 "Therefore, touch 
and see, taste and see. "268 Rufinus pointed out, too, that people 
commonly say "Smell and see, hear and see. "269 He held that "con-
sequently such testimony is everywhere to be received, as about 
that matter which we see with our bodily eyes.,,270 Rufinus thus 
succeeded in interpreting Gratian's rule in a practical manner to 
allow testimony based on any direct knowledge to remain a proper 
basis for a judge's consideration, whereas derivative hearing evi-
dence-what a witness "heard had been or was being narrated by 
another"271-was discarded. 
The French school of legal writers' Summa "Elegantius in iure 
diuino" (1169)272 took the same approach as Rufinus: "[1]t is clear 
that testimony from hearing can be taken in two ways: either we 
knew a matter to be so by the very experience of our ears or we 
learned it was so from the report of others. The latter is rejected 
"273 
265. "[p]rimum autem non nisi improprie testimonium de auditu dicitur. proprie \'ero de 
visu, i.e. de eo, quod. cum fiebat, videndo i.e. audiendo plene percipiebatur." Id. 
266. "Visus enim pro omni corporeo sensu accipitur .... " Id. 
267. See supra text accompanying note 197. 
268. "Unde palpate et videte, gustate et videte." Rufinus. supra note 255, at 271. 
269. "Olpha et vide, audi et vide." Id. 
270. "[p]ropterea tale testimonium ubique est accipiendum, sicut de ea re, quam 
corporeis oculis videmus." Id. 
271. See supra text accompanying note 259. 
272. See Summa "Elegantius in iure diuino" (Summa Coloniensis), in 2 Summa 
"Elegantius in iure diuino" seu Coloniensis 128 (G6rard Fransen & Stephan Kuttner eds., 
MIC Series A: Corpus Glossatorum vol. I, 1978). The author may have been Bertram of 
Metz or Godfrey of Cologne. See G6rard Fransen & Stephan Kuttner, Introduction to 2 
Summa "Elegantius in iure diuino" seu Coloniensis, supra, at xi, xi. 
273. "[p]erspicuum est ex auditu duobus modis ferri testimonium: si ita se habere ipsa 
aurium experientia cognouimus aut si aliorum relatu ita factum didicimus, et hoc 
refutatur." Summa "Elegantius in iure diuino" 6.76, supra note 272, at 137-38. 
Other treatises were consistent in interpreting the sight requirement as a metaphor for 
any corporeal sense. See, e.g., Ordo iudiciarius, in Der Ordo iudiciarius des Codex 
Bambergensis P.I.11 (1181185), in 70 Sitzungsberichte der kaiserlichen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Classe, Heft I, at 285, 309 (Johann F.R. von 
Schulte ed., Wien, Karl Gerold's Sohn 1872) (the Ordo was composed for use in Ireland or 
England); see Fowler-Magerl, supra note 136, at 105; Gualterus, Ordo judiciarius 
"Scientiam" c.28 (1235/40), in 2 Quellen zur Geschichte des rOmisch-kanonischen: 
Processes im Mittelalter, Heft I, at 51 (Ludwig Wahrmund ed., 1913). 
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Johannes Teutonicus adopted Rufinus's interpretation of hear-
ing-based testimony in producing the most influential interpreta-
tion of Gratian's Decretum. About 1217, Johannes composed 
marginal notations, called glosses, to accompany and explain Gra-
tian's entire text. Legal scholars soon accepted his gloss as authori-
tative and referred to it as the "standard gloss" (glossa 
ordinaria).274 With respect to Gratian's requirement that witnesses 
speak only about "what they saw and knew,"275 Johannes 
explained, "that is, what they perceived through some bodily sense, 
for sight is to be understood broadly."276 
At roughly the same time as these canonical attempts to define 
hearsay, Roman law scholars, or legists, arrived at similar conclu-
sions. Three important Romanists make this unmistakable. Alber-
icus de Porta Ravennate, a student of one of the most outstanding 
doctors of the Roman law,277 produced a summary (summula) 
dealing with witnesses.278 Its sources are derived solely from 
Roman law.279 Commenting on witness testimony, Albericus said: 
Witnesses are said to be [those] who say those things in 
person [viva voce], at which they were present, and about 
those things only they shall bear testimony which were 
done in their presence. For they shall say that they them-
selves were present to these [events], which were being 
done, and which they saw .... "280 
274. See Smith, supra note 133, at 37-38; van de Wiel, supra note 139, at 116; von 
Schulte, supra note 230, at 172-75. The practice of glossing Roman and canonical texts was 
a common method legal scholars employed to clarify and teach the law. See Smith, supra 
note 133, at 15-16. For descriptions of the Glossators' methods and influence, see Peter 
Weimar, Die legistische Literatur der Glossatorenzeit, in 1 Handbuch. supra note 227, at 
129, 129-40. 
275. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
276. "[I]d est ali quo sensu corporeo perceperunt. large enim sumitur visus." Johannes 
Teutonicus, Glossa ordinaria gl. "Que nouerunt et viderunt" on C.3 q.9 c.15, in Decretum 
Gratiani emendatum et annotationibus iIIustratum una cum Glossis col. 953 (Paris, Soc. 
Bonae Navis 1601). 
277. Albericus was a student of Bulgarus. one of the "Four Doctors" at Bologna most 
learned in Roman law. See Smith, supra note 133, at 12, 30. 
278. See Summula de testibus ab Alberico de Porta Ravennate composita (1166/97) 
(Erich Genzmer ed.), in 1 Studi di Storia e Diritto in onore di Enrico Besta 481, 496 (A. 
Guiffre ed., 1937-1939) [hereinafter Albericus]. 
279. Donahue, supra note 241, at 131. 
280. "Testes dicuntur, qui viva voce dicunt ea, quibus interfuerunt, et de his demum 
testimonium ferre debent, que sub eorum presentia acta sunt. dicere enim debent sese 
affuisse his, que agebantur, et vidisse .... " Albericus 1.2, supra note 278, at 496. 
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Azo (1150-1230), whose summary of Justinian's Code was uni-
versally cited to courts as the highest authority,281 interpreted Jus-
tinian's provisions about proof of debt payment to allow an 
exception to the hearsay rule, "but othenvise testimony from hear-
ing is not believed."282 In about 1250, Accursius (1182-1260) sup-
plied the standard gloss for Justinian's legislation. This gloss was 
accepted as the authoritative interpretation of any passage of Jus-
tinian and was reproduced in the margins of succeeding manu-
scripts and printings of Justinian's works into the seventeenth 
century.283 Explicating Justinian's restrictions on testimony about 
debt payment, Accursius noted: "[The witnesses] must give their 
testimony based on knowledge . . .. Concerning what they heard 
from another, however, they may not [testify] .... "284 
Roman and canon law scholars agreed that hearsay was not to 
form the basis of a judgment, even when it was a learned judge 
who evaluated the testimony.28S 
281. As to the influence of Azo's Summa within and beyond Italy, see Pietro Fiorelli, 
Azzone, in 4 Dizionario biografico degli Italiani 714, 771 (1962). 
282. "[A]lias autem de auditu testimonio non creditur .•.. n Azo, Summa Codicis 4.de 
Testibus no. 24 (1208110), in Azonis Summa col. 324 (Venice. apud Societatum Minimam 
1610). 
283. For the authority and influence of the Accursian gloss, see Cappelletti et aI., supra 
note 129, at 20; Pietro Fiorelli, Accorso, in 1 Dizionario biografico degJi Italiani 116 (1960). 
284. "[D]e sua scientia debent reddere testimonium .• " De auditu autem alieno non 
.... " Accursius, Glossa ordinaria gl. "Praesto" on C.4.20.18, in Corpus Juris Civilis 
Accursii glossa in volumen col. 865 (photo. reprint 1967) (Venice, Baptista de Tortis 1487). 
285. Jewish law asserted the same rule. In 1180, the great Je\vish scholar, Moses 
Maimonides (1135-1204), finished his composition of the Mishneh Torah (yad.Hazakah). 
See Maimonides' Mishneh Torah (Yad Hazakah) !xv (Philip Birnbaum ed., 1944). It 
constituted "a repository of all Jewish teachings from the time of Moses the laWgiver to the 
time of Moses Maimonides." Id. The last book of the Mishneh Torah discusses procedure 
in the Jewish courts. See The Code of Maimonides: Book Fourteen, The Book of Judges 
(Julian Obermann et aI. eds. & Abraham M. Hershman trans., Yale Judaica Series vol. 3, 
1949) [hereinafter The Book of Judges]. Jewish evidentiary rules, as Maimonides set them 
out, heavily emphasized due process. See Treatise II, Laws Concerning Evidence, in The 
Book of Judges, supra, at 81. For a summary of the Mishneh Torah's rules of evidence, see 
Maimonides' Minesh Torah, supra, at 309-13. For a comprehensive study of Je\vish rules of 
proof, see Z. Frankel, Der gerichtliche Beweis nach mosaisch-taJmudischem Rechte (1846). 
In his treatise on evidence, Maimonides clearly sets out the bar against hearsay: 
If a person is advised by others that So-and-so has transgressed such-and-such a 
negative command, or that So-and-so has borrowed money from So-and-so, even 
if his informants be many in number and great in wisdom and fear of God, and he 
believes what they tell him as though he had witnessed it himself, he is not 
permitted to give evidence. He may testify only if he saw it with his own eyes, or 
if the borrower personally admitted the loan to him, saying to him, "Bear 
testimony that So-and-so has loaned me a maneh," . • •. One who bases his 
testimony on what others have told him is a false witness and transgresses a 
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XII. "THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER" 
Another Bolognese scholar, Tancred, achieved the greatest pre-
cision in articulating the doctrine of hearsay. After studying under 
both Azo and Johannes Teutonicus,286 Tancred composed his Ordo 
iudiciorum (1216).287 The writing of such orders of procedure had 
become quite common in the latter half of the twelfth century, and 
the genre continued to flourish well thereafter.288 Tancred's 
phrases concerning hearsay bear a striking resemblance to those 
used by Anglo-American lawyers today: "But if the witness per-
ceived by hearing the truth of the matter [veritatem rei] about 
which he is testifying . . . such testimony is valid. "289 Thus, if by 
hearing a witness directly perceived the truth of a relevant issue, he 
could testify. For example, said Tancred, a witness could testify 
that he heard thunder, if thunder was in issue.29o It followed that, if 
the relevant issue was whether something was said-blasphemy, 
for example-the witness could testify to what he heard. Where 
the truth, however, was perceived by another and the witness in 
court wished to testify to what that other had perceived, he could 
not do so, because the witness did not himself perceive the truth of 
the fact. By focusing on the direct perception of the truth in issue, 
negative command, as it is said: Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy 
neighbor (Exod. 20:13). 
Evidence 17.1, in The Book of Judges, supra, at 119, 119-20 (emphasis in original). The 
similiarities between the Jewish and Roman rules are striking. Both bar hearsay and make 
an exception regarding debt payment. The relationship, if any, between the two systems is 
unknown. In any event, medieval Romano-canonical procedure did not appear to profit 
from Maimonides' clear articulation of the rule: "[N]either Jewish thought nor Jewish law 
seems to have had any substantial influence on the legal systems of the West. at least so far 
as the surviving literature shows." Bennan, supra note 230, at 589 n.85. 
286. See Smith, supra note 133, at 38. 
287. For the text, see Tancred, Ordo iudiciarius. in Pillius, Tancredus, Gratia, Libri de 
iudiciorum ordine 87 (photo. reprint 1965) (Friedrich Bergmann ed., G6ttingen. 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1842) [hereinafter Tancred]. For a comprehensive overview of 
Tancred's Ordo, see L. ChevaiIIer, Tancredus, in 7 Dictionnaire de droit canonique cols. 
1146-65 (R. Naz ed., 1965). For analysis of Tancred's provisions for examining witnesses, 
see Donahue, supra note 241, at 128-34. 
288. For accounts of the genre's development among Roman law scholars and canonists, 
see Donahue, supra note 241; Knut W. N6rr, Ordo iudiciorum und Ordo Iudiciarius, in 11 
Studia Gratiana 327 (1967); A.M. Stickler, Ordines judiciarii, in 6 Dictionnaire de droit 
canonique, supra note 287, col. 1132 (1957); see also Fowler-Magerl, supra note 136 
(exhaustively analyzing the authorship, dating and background of the ordines). 
289. "Si vera testis percepit auditu veritatem rei, super qua testificatur . . . tale 
testimonium valet." Tancred 3.9.2, supra note 287, at 239-40. 
290. "Quia . . . audivit tonitrua, de quibus fit quaestio, et de tali auditu reddit 
testimonium, tale testimonium valet." ("That ... he heard thunder, about which there is a 
question-[if] from such hearing he gave testimony, such testimony is valid.") Id. at 240. 
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Tancred supplied a key term. to distinguish valid from invalid hear-
ing-based testimony. At the same time, he pinpointed the reason 
for not allowing hearsay: no judge should depend on derivative 
oral evidence to establish truth. 
Exercising wide influence in both ecclesiastical and secular 
COurts,291 Tancred's work towered in importance above all other 
orders of procedure.292 With his Ordo, Romano-canonical proce-
dure fundamentally took its finished fOrm..293 Although William 
Durand's encyclopedic Speculum iudiciale294 (1271) soon became 
an even more effective vehicle for the spread of the Romano-
canonical system across the European continent,29S Durand drew 
heavily upon the work of his predecessor Tancred.296 In fact, the 
Speculum faithfully reproduces Tancred's hearsay doctrine.297 
The penetration of learned Romano-canonical principles into 
secular courts did not, of course, happen all at once. The process 
of reception was gradual and varied from region to region.298 Nev-
ertheless, according to one account, a secular court applied the rule 
against hearsay as early as the mid-thirteenth century. Philippe de 
Beaumanoir (c. 1247-96), who had a long career as a judge and 
royal official,299 reduced to writing the customary law of the Beau-
291. See William H. Dunham, Jr •• General Preface to Radulphi de Hengham Summae 
ix, xviii (William H. Dunham. Jr. ed., 1932). 
292. See NOrr, supra note 288, at 339. 
293. See Donahue, supra note 241, at 129; Knut W. NOrr, Die Literatur zum gemeinen 
Zivilprozess, in 1 Handbuch, supra note 227, at 383, 384. 
294. For the text, see Guillelmus Durantis, Speculum iudiciale (lst ed. 1271n6, 2d. ed. 
1289191), in 1 Wilhelm Durantis, Speculum iudiciale (photo. reprint 1975) (Gul. Durandi 
Episcopi Speculum Iuris, 2 vols., Basel, Froben 1574) [hereinafter Speculum]. 
295. Dunham, supra note 291, at xviii-xix; see L. Falletti, Guillaume Durand, in 5 
Dictionnaire de droit canonique, supra note W, col. 1014 (1953) (describing in detail the 
Speculum, its sources and its influence). For comprehensive descriptions of Romano-
canonical procedure in its fully developed form, see Paul Fournier, Les officialit~ au 
moyen age (paris, E. Plan 1880); J. Ph. Uvy, La hi~rarchie des preuves dans Ie droit savant 
du Moyen-Age (Annales de I'Univerist~ de Lyon 3d ser., No.5, 1939). 
296. See Falletti, supra note 295, at 1036, 1050. 
297. See 1 Speculum 1.4.52-53. supra note 294, at 294. Durand adds a useful distinction. 
If the wimess perceived the truth of the matter through his own hearing (alldilU proprio), 
as in hearing slanderous words, an admission that a debt \vas paid, or thunder, such 
testimony is valid because it is like seeing. Testimony concerning what one heard from 
another (auditu alieno) is not valid. Id. 
298. For accounts of the reception of the "learned" Romano-canonical law into the 
various areas of Western Europe, together \vith bibliographies on the malter, see Helmut 
Coing, Einieitung, in 1 Handbuch, supra note 227, at 3, 25; Norbert Hom, Die legistische 
Literatur der Kommentatoren und der Ausbreitung des gelebrten Rechts, in 1 Handbuch, 
supra note 227, at 261. 
299. See F.R.P. Akehurst, Introduction to The Courumes de Beauvaisis of Philippe de 
Beaumanoir, supra note I, at xiii, xiv-xix. 
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vais region. Commenting on witness testimony, Beaumanoir stated 
that those who are appointed to hear cases 
should pay great attention and understand how the wit-
nesses respond to questions which are made of them, 
whether by knowledge, or by belief, or by suspicion 
[quidier]; because if the witness says: "I know it," [the one 
hearing the case] should ask: "How do you know that?" 
And if the witness answers: "I heard it said [l'oy dire] 
from this one and from that other," this testimony is of no 
value, because it is contrary to the same when he says: "I 
know for certain," which he does not know except by 
hearsay [oir dire]. Therefore, whoever wishes to say: "I 
know it for certain," cannot say it if he does not say "I 
was present and I saw it . . . . And of those who testify 
only by suspicion, or by hearsay, it is a certain thing that 
their testimonies count for nothing, however many they 
may be.30o 
The treatment of hearsay reported by Beaumanoir captures the 
Romano-canonical rule and shows a secular court applying it. 
Indeed, Beaumanoir's use of the vernacular oir dire (hear-say) 
expresses more clearly than the Latin testimonium ex auditu (testi-
mony from hearing) the precise evil the Romano-canonical doc-
trine targeted.30l The rationale for the rejection is equally clear: 
testimony from firsthand knowledge is the best basis for a factfind-
ing judge's consideration. 
The early reception of the hearsay rule is also evident in Spanish 
courts. The Siete Partidas (1263/65), the great compilation of 
300.[P]oent et doivent oir tesmoins, doivent mult regarder et entendre comment Ii 
tesmong respondent as demandes qui lor sunt fetes, ou par savoir, ou par croire, 
ou par quidier; car se Ii tesmoins dist: "Je Ie sai," Ii auditeres Ii doit demander: 
"Comment Ie saves voz?" Et se Ii tesmoins respont: "Je I'oy dire a celi et a cel 
autre," tex tesmongnages est de nule valeur, car iI est contraires a Ii meismes 
quant iI dist: "Je sai de certain," ce qu'iI ne set fors que par oir dire. Donques, qui 
veut dire: "Je Ie sai de certain," iI ne Ie pot dire s'iI ne dist: "G'i fui presens et Ie 
vi" . . . . Et de cix qui ne tesmongnent fors que de quidier, ou par oir dire, iI est 
certaine cose que lors tesmongnages ne vaut riens, com bien qu'iI soient. 
Philippe de Beaumanoir, Les Coutumes de Beauvoisis 40.12, in 2 Les Coutumes du 
Beauvoisis par Philippe de Beaumanoir 135-36 (Paris, Jules Renouard 1842). For an Eng-
lish translation of the entire text of the Coutumes de Beauvaisis, see The Coutumes de 
Beauvaisis of Philippe de Beaumanoir, supra note 1. 
301. The vernacular German legal maxim shows the same advance over the Latin. 
"Zeuge vom HOrensagen [hearsay] gilt im Recht nicht." ("A hearsay witness has no worth 
in the law,") See Albrecht Foth, Gelehrtes rOmisch-kanonisches Recht in deutschen 
RechtssprichwOrtern 147 (24 Juristische Studien, 1971). 
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Alfonso the Tenth (the Wise), included the Romano-canonical doc-
trine.302 The Partidas directed the judge to ask what basis the wit-
ness had for his testimony. If the witness replied that he was 
present at the event, his testimony was valid. Hearsay testimony 
(el testimonio de oyda), however, was rejected.303 "But if he says 
he heard it said by another, what he testifies is incompetent. "3~ 
XIII. FLEXIBILITY OF THE RULE 
The medieval rule was not absolute. Tancred admitted various 
exceptions for determining blood relationships, for establishing 
facts beyond anyone's memory and for the admission of a creditor 
that he had been paid.30S These early exceptions show that the 
Romano-canonical rule contained some flexibility, just as the 
Anglo-American rule does.106 
Adding to these narrow exceptions, inquisitional procedure,307 
beginning in the late twelfth century, broadened the possibilities 
for using hearsay. An inquisitional judge could use "common 
fame" (fama) to establish that there was sufficient reason to begin 
an investigation on his own authority (ex officio).3OS Fama con-
sisted of a well-founded suspicion, widely held by prudent and hon-
est persons, that someone had committed an act that should be 
investigated.309 Those alleging the fama could not be merely spite-
ful and slanderous, and their allegations had to be based on fre-
302. It was King Alfonso's intention to set out in the vernacular the principles of Roman 
and canon law. See Alfonso Garcfa Gallo, Nuevas observaciones sobre la obm legislativa 
de Alfonso X, 46 Anuario de Historia del Derecho Espanol 609, 640-41 (1976). 
303. Las Siete Partidas, Partida 3.16.28, in 3 Los C6digos Espanoles concordados y 
anotados 168 (Madrid, La Publicidad 1848). 
304. "Mas si dixere que la oyera dezir a otro, non cumple 10 que testigua." Id. 
305. Tancred, supra note 287, at 239-40. 
306. See Mirjan Dam~a, Hearsay in Cinquecento Italy, in 1 Studi in Onore di Vittorio 
Denti 59, 70 (Michele Taruffo ed., 1994) (an excellent study of the shape and impact of the 
Romano-canonical hearsay rule in Renaissance Italy). See also Mirjan Dam~ka. Of 
Hearsay and Its Analogues, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 425 (1992) (analyzing the Romano-canonical 
approach to hearsay on the continent of Europe, with a comparison to Anglo-American 
procedure). The author is grateful to Professor Dam~ka for supplying him a copy of his 
work in manuscript form. 
307. As opposed to accusatorial procedure, which required an individual accuser, 
inquisitional procedure allowed a judge to initiate investigation of misconduct without any 
accuser. See Friedrich A. Biener, Beitr1ige zu der Geschichte des Inquisitions-Processes 
und der Geschwomen-Gerichte 45-49 (Leipzig, Karl Knobloch 1827). For an analyis of the 
reasons underlying the growth of inquisitional procedure, see Richard M. Fraher, The 
Theoretical Justification for the New Criminal Law of the High Middle Ages: "Rei 
Publicae Interest, Ne Crimina Remaneant Impunita", 1984 U. DL L. Rev. 517. 
308. Biener, supra note 307, at 49. 
309. Id. 
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quent public reports.310 Proving the lama by eyewitness testimony 
was, of course, difficult. According to the thirteenth-century jurist 
Thomas de Piperata, "[i]f the court asked the witness, 'How do you 
know that there is lama about this matter?' and the witness 
responded that he heard it from other people, the testimony was 
not probative."311 In order to avoid the problem of hearsay, 
Thomas suggested that the court should not ask the witness how he 
knew of the lama but should "prompt the witness to say that the 
greater part of the populace believed such and such to be true, 
[ although] the witness had no idea about the origin of the 
belief. "312 
If lama was established, its effect was sharply limited. Function-
ing like probable cause in Anglo-American procedure, it could 
lead to the detention of a suspect before trial and to the initiation 
of criminal proceedings.313 In combination with other circumstan-
tial proof, lama could also lead to the initiation of torture in order 
to extract a confession.314 Jurists of the twelfth and thirteenth cen-
turies were unanimously hostile to the use of lama in trials, how-
ever.315 They allowed its use in civil matters only to confirm proofs 
already made.316 In criminal cases, where proof "as clear as day" 
was required for conviction,317 lama "fell far short of the quantum 
of proof needed for conviction."318 According to Thomas, lama 
could not establish guilt. It could only "validate the testimony of 
witnesses whose character or testimony was not above 
exception. "319 
Thomas de Piperata recognized that the role of lama in inquisi-
tional procedure conflicted with the medieval ban on hearsay, 
despite these limits on its use.320 To the extent that lama could be 
established by hearsay, the medieval rule against hearsay was more 
flexible than it later would become in England, but its force was 
310. Id. An eyewitness to misconduct could not establish lama. Id. 
311. Fraher, supra note 235. at 34. 
312. Id. 
313. Id. at 33; Barbara J. Shapiro, "Beyond Reasonable Doubt" and "Probable Cause": 
Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence 119 (1991). 
314. Fraher, supra note 235, at 34. 
315. See Levy, supra note 295, at 114. 
316. Id. at 115. 
317. Id. In criminal cases, Romano-canonical procedure required proof by two direct 
witnesses or a confession. Fraher, supra note 307, at 587. 
318. Fraher, supra note 235, at 37. 
319. Id. 
320. See supra text accompanying note 311. 
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not lost.321 Where there was no lama. no hearsay could be taken 
into account, and even where lama existed, it could not suffice for 
a conviction, although it might establish probable cause. The Con-
tinental rule, therefore, still directed the judge to mistrust hearsay 
and not to rest his verdict upon it. 
XIV. CoNCLUSION 
The twelfth- and thirteenth-century revival of legal studies, both 
Roman and canonical, established reason as the basis for judicial 
judgment. Resolving disputes between litigants on a rational basis 
seems self-evident today, but reason's role was not secure when 
scholars of the Roman and ecclesiastical law first labored to delin-
eate their procedures and doctrine. In fact, subInitting contested 
matters to decision by reason represented "an event of capital 
importance"322 in an age when trial by ordeal and combat were not 
far from mind. The Romano-canonical procedure provided a way 
for judges to arrive at a decision reliably. 
The rule against ~earsay created by jurists in the twelfth and thir-
teenth centuries on the authority of texts deeply rooted in the 
Western legal tradition represents one aspect of this flowering of 
rational decision making. The factfinding procedure of the legists 
and canonists required decisions based on reliable evidence. A 
judgment was sufficiently trustworthy only if based on the testi-
mony of witnesses who appeared in court, subject to examination, 
and testified under oath on the basis of personal knowledge. The 
hearsay rule is simply the negative corollary of the requirement 
that firsthand evidence be tested. 
The demand for in-court testing was so strong that judges were 
ordinarily directed to reject hearsay even though it may be true. 
Ivo recognized this in the eleventh century.323 Rational procedure 
would not perInit so serious a matter as a court judgment to rest on 
unexamined out-of-court statements that Inight possibly be true. 
The legists and canonists directed factfinding judges not to consider 
derivative testimony, even though they understood this restriction 
might require judges to disregard some true testimony. In making 
321. Recourse to the exceptions in the Romano-canonical system was not easy. See 
Damalka, Hearsay in Cinquecento Italy, supra note 306, at 74. The system's rule retained 
its "negative effect" and "could prevent judges from declaring proof of a factual 
proposition, no matter how strongly they believed it to be successful." DamaSka, Of 
Hearsay and Its Analogues, supra note 306, at 440·41. 
322. Levy, supra note 295, at 163 (translated from the French). 
323. See supra text accompanying note 225. 
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this decision, the legists and canonists resisted compromising the 
integrity of the factfinding procedures they embraced as the best 
way to arrive at a just result. 
As noted at the outset, these rational principles have nothing to 
do with skepticism about jurors. If skepticism lurks in the 
Romano-canonical rule, it is the skepticism that warns any 
factfinder, even a professional, against crediting untested evidence. 
The rule, as it developed on the Continent, was addressed to the 
judge as decision maker. It was in no sense a device to shield gulli-
ble jurors from unreliable evidence. Viewed as a rule for the court 
as decision maker, the heart of the hearsay rule is revealed. A 
judgment should not be based on inherently unreliable derivative 
evidence no matter who the factfinder may be. 
The long traditions and scholarly efforts that gave birth to the 
Romano-canonical hearsay doctrine, however, could not guarantee 
that factfinders would obey it.324 No one could enter into the mind 
of the judge to be sure that the rule of the scholars was honored in 
practice. The constant reiteration of the rule, along with the enor-
mous attention given to its proper understanding, indicates that the 
rule was intended to be an essential part of proper procedure, and 
a judge violated the integrity of the legal process if he convicted on 
the basis of hearsay. An unscrupulous judge might nevertheless do 
so, and even a conscientious one could unwittingly credit hearsay 
when he should not. Other than by appeal, which could rarely, if 
ever, ascertain whether a judge had violated the rule, the system 
had no mechanism to ensure compliance with the ban. 
It may be said with Wigmore that England's hearsay rule, when 
it developed, contributed much to the world's jurisprudence. The 
English, however, were late to restrict witnesses to firsthand 
knowledge related and tested in court. While Romano-canonical 
procedure carefully defined hearsay and taught that it should gen-
erally be disregarded, the English had yet to place any limit on its 
use. This tardiness in developing a hearsay rule occurred in part 
because English procedure, unlike that of the Continent, did not 
depend upon the presentation of witnesses in court until sometime 
at the end of the fifteenth century.325 Even then England was slow 
to grasp the lesson of the Continental scholars. The English hear-
say bar was not fully established until the late seventeenth cen-
324. See Dama~ka, Hearsay in Cinquecento Italy, supra note 306, at 85. 
325. See 5 Wigmore, supra note 9, § 1364, at 15. 
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tury.326 Nonetheless, when England finally adopted a hearsay ban, 
the rule included an effective enforcement mechanism such that no 
one could doubt the force of the hearsay bar.327 When an English 
judge excluded hearsay, it could not possibly play a part in the 
jury's verdict. Moreover, once the English rule was fully estab-
lished, it left no role at trial for the Continental doctrine of "com-
mon fame." 
The institution of the jury did not, however, create the need for 
the hearsay rule. The rejection of hearsay is part and parcel of any 
process of dependable decision making, regardless of who finds the 
facts. Long before England developed its system of trial by lay 
jurors under the guidance of a judge, medieval jurists articulated 
the hearsay rule in a system involving factfinders who were sophis-
ticated professionals. The scholars of the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries meticulously differentiated what statements based on a 
witness's hearing could form the basis for a judgment, and they 
carefully and emphatically rejected the great mass of hearsay. 
The medieval jurists' hearsay rule constitutes one of Western 
legal culture's great guides to reliable verdicts. The guidance of the 
rule is as valuable to today's educated jurors as it was to the sophis-
ticated judges for whom it was fashioned. 
326. See id. at 18. For discussion of whether the later English rule is related to the 
Romano-canonical rule, see Shapiro, supra note 313, at 198-200. 
327. See Dam~ka, Hearsay in Cinquecento Italy, supra note 306, at 85. 
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